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A relatively new area of economics seeks to understand the decision making and internal 
processes of organizations. In the context of firms, there are usually laws and contracts 
that control the firm’s operations. These controls help secure firms’ future outside 
financing. Understanding how and whether the control mechanisms work is therefore 
very important, and has become an active field of economic and financial research.  
 
The first two essays in this dissertation are devoted to studying the determinants of 
corporate control instruments. The first chapter examines the role of large investors, in 
particular that of financial institutions who are often considered to be passive on control 
issues. An important implication from theory indicates that a large investor improves a 
firm’s performance through monitoring. The empirical literature provides some evidence 
for enhanced performance at firms with existing large investor, but due to the empirical 
approach it does not tell us much about how the large investors emerge, while the theory 
has also implied that the incentive to acquire large holdings should increase when the 
demand for monitoring goes up, as credible monitoring requires large shareholding. To 
test the hypothesis that large shareholding will be more likely when the value of 
monitoring rises, I identify proxies for value of monitoring based on agency problems. 
Using data on institutional ownership and firm characteristics for large U.S. public 
companies from 1992 to 2001, I find that the firms where shareholder monitoring could 
be more valuable are indeed more likely to have a large institutional holding. To rule out 
the possibilities that large institutions arise for non-monitoring reasons somehow related 
to the agency measures, I further verify that large institutional holdings indeed lead to 
more monitoring. I find that large institutions are linked to less empire building behavior, 
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as evident in both capital expenditure and acquisition activities. I do not find strong 
evidence for large institutions facilitating value-increasing takeovers, although they do 
have small negative effect on firm’s takeover defense. Together with the result that 
institutions choose to acquire large holdings of firms where their monitoring could be 
profitable, this study gives further support for institutional investors’ active role in 
corporate governance. 
 
The second essay tests how market competitiveness affects the structure of managerial 
compensation contracts. Agency theory predicts the use of relative performance 
evaluation (RPE) in incentive contracts – that RPE helps filter a common industry or 
market effect by evaluating an individual firm’s performance relative to other firms 
facing the same effects. The literature suggests that product market competition enhances 
the usefulness of RPE, because in more competitive environments managers are more 
likely to face similar uncertainties, have more peers, and are less likely to affect other 
firms’ output. This paper empirically confirms this argument using the 1996 deregulation 
of the U.S. telecommunications industry as a natural experiment. This event exogenously 
intensified competition in the industry, which helps overcome the empirical limitations 
common to existing studies. We adopt a difference-in-differences design using size- and 
performance-matched manufacturing firms as the benchmarks. The results indicate that, 
relative to the benchmark firms, telecommunications firms strengthened the (negative) tie 
between managerial compensation and peer performance after the Act. The effect is 
significant for peer stock returns, and in the same direction, though not significant, for 
peer accounting return on equity. The results suggest that relative performance evaluation 
became more valuable for telecommunication firms after the Act. 
 
The third essay studies the response of state spending to windfall revenue using tobacco 
settlements in the U.S. in the late 1990s as a natural experiment. The settlements commit 
tobacco companies to making annual payments to perpetuity, with total payments over 
the first 25 years estimated at several hundred billion dollars. The magnitude and duration 
of the payments provide a unique natural experiment to study individual state spending 
responses to the windfall receipts, and re-evaluate the “flypaper effect”. Since the tobacco 
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payments are not only unconditional non-earmarked lump-sum transfers to state 
governments, but also exogenous to policy variations, this study avoids potential 
estimation bias that is often criticized in the “flypaper effect” literature. We adopt a first 
differencing approach and find strong evidence of the flypaper effect. State direct 
spending increases by about $1 in response to a one dollar increase in settlement funds, 
and by about 8 cents for a similar increase in private income. States also respond 
differently to the windfall revenue. Those with a higher adult smoking prevalence rate, or 










We are often concerned that managers at public corporations may not work in the best 
interest of shareholders. They need to be monitored sometimes replaced. Theory has 
suggested that shareholders, especially large ones, can play the function of monitoring the 
managers, affect the decision-making and ultimately the value of their investment1. Is this 
really the case? Existing empirical literature tests the theoretical implication, and some 
studies find that the existence of a large investor does enhance firm performance. This 
provides partial evidence of the theory though, because it only shows what happens to 
firm performance when a large investor already exists. The empirical evidence does not 
tell us much about how the large investors emerge, while the theory has also implied that 
the incentive to acquire large holdings should increase when the demand for monitoring 
goes up, as credible monitoring requires large shareholding. 
 
In this chapter, I empirically test the latter implication. I look at financial institutions 
(such as mutual funds, etc) in particular, not only because institutional ownership in the 
                                                 
1 This is because monitoring in public companies with dispersed ownership has public good properties. By 
resolving the free-rider problem associated with costly monitoring, the presence of large shareholders can 
enhance firm value. There are different mechanisms by which large shareholder enhances value. For 
instance, the study by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) shows large shareholders improve firm values by 
bringing in value-increasing takeovers. Chidambaran and John (1998) present a mechanism where the large 
investor acquires private information and conveys that to other smaller investors. Admati and Pfleiderer 
(2006) argue the threat of exit-by-feet or “Wall Street Walk” can also be a form of activism, contrary to the 
common belief that liquidity hinders investor monitoring. In practice, shareholder activism often takes the 
form of involvement in the regulation of institutional investors, voting in board elections, submitting proxy 
proposals, directly negotiating with the management, or targeting firms publicly through media. 
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U.S. has become so important2, but also that the way they invest is quite puzzling. As 
financial intermediaries who aggregate smaller investments allowing individual investors 
to benefit from diversification and lower transaction cost, they are most likely to remain 
passive on corporate control issues (often labeled by following the “Wall Street Rule”). 
However, what we have observed in recent years is quite the opposite. Institutions often 
hold significant positions within large firms that may be hard to justify by risk and return 
only. This study thus contributes to the existing empirical literature on investor activism 
by addressing the motivation of block institutional holding that is usually missing in the 
literature, and providing more supportive evidence of activism. I also incorporate a richer 
set of determinants for ownership structure, with measures related to the agency problems 
due to firm’s underlying uncertainty, but also related to agency problems that are caused 
by the lack of alternative control instruments. These measures later serve as instruments 
for the ownership variable when I study the evidence of control. 
 
My approach to the problem consists of two steps. I first test whether the tendency of 
having large stake is correspondent with the potential benefits offered by monitoring. To 
assess how large the return is for monitoring, I use proxy variables that are related to the 
degree of information asymmetry between management and owners. I then examine 
whether we can draw inferences of monitoring for firms with large institutional investor. 
For the first step, I identify the presence of a large institutional investor (defined as those 
with block holdings of at least 5% of the outstanding equity) in nearly 1400 large US 
public corporations during the years 1992-2001. In order to test that these large 
institutional holdings arise from potential benefits of monitoring, variations in the value 
of monitoring are necessary. There are two main comparative statics. First, the limit to 
takeover threat calls for a bigger role of shareholder monitoring. As the discipline of 
takeover is reduced at some firms due to their legislative arrangements that fostered 
stronger anti-takeover protection, the return for internal monitoring becomes greater. I 
measure the takeover pressure through an index developed by Gompers et al (2003) that 
quantifies anti-takeover related amendments and legislation at both state and firm levels. 
The second prediction is that, uncertainty at the individual firm level makes shareholder 
                                                 
2 The percentage shareholding among U.S. public companies has surpassed 50% in the mid 1990s. 
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monitoring more rewarding. When there is little idiosyncratic uncertainty, firm 
performance is revealing of manager’s effort input, and it would not pay for the 
institutions to monitor. When firm-specific uncertainty or risk is high, it becomes difficult 
for the market to determine whether poor performance is driven by manager slacking or 
unfavorable shocks. And monitoring, if generates additional information on management 
beyond what is revealed from a public signal such as firm profit, would help strengthen 
managerial incentives. Firm-specific uncertainty is proxied by the residual standard 
deviation from the CAPM regression. However, large shareholding for monitoring 
purpose involves the opportunity cost of less diversification, and uncertainty exacerbates 
the problem. I expect this cost of risk exposure is relatively low compared to the benefit 
of monitoring, when uncertainty is low or firms are small. 
 
The empirical results are consistent with the predictions. Firms are more likely to have 
large institutional investors when institutional arrangements make takeovers harder.  
Firm-specific risk has a positive impact, but the effect is weaker at a higher level of risk, 
consistent with an increasing cost due to deviation from perfect diversification.  
Comparative statics for other firm characteristics related to capital structures are also 
presented. The results are not sensitive to alternative specifications or the presence of 
endogeneity bias. 
 
To exclude possibilities that institutions hold large stake for reasons other than 
monitoring, I further test whether larger institutional holdings indeed relate to firm 
outcomes in ways that are consistent with monitoring. Various venues through which 
large institutions improve the firm’s status quo are investigated. There is some evidence 
that large institutions affect firm’s real decision making: I find large institutions are 
linked to less empire building behavior, as evident in both capital expenditure and 
acquisition activities. I do not find strong evidence for large institutions facilitating 
takeovers, although they do have small negative effect on firm’s takeover defense. 
Together with the result that institutions choose to acquire large holdings in firms where 
their monitoring could be profitable, this study gives further support for institutional 




The chapter is organized in the following way. In the next section, I summarize the 
relevant empirical research. I then outline a theoretical framework, followed by a 
discussion of the empirical method and data used. The main empirical results are 
presented in 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the ex post evidence of monitoring. And 2.6 
concludes. 
2.2 Related Literature  
Prior empirical research on investor activism usually examines the impact on firm 
performance, due to large outside investors that are already in place. In the common 
approach, the presence of a large shareholder is taken as given, and used as a proxy for 
shareholder monitoring efforts. If a positive correlation is found between the presence of 
large shareholders and firm performance, it is interpreted as the evidence for effects of 
monitoring. This empirical approach does not give much consideration for the potential 
endogeneity in the ownership variable, and therefore makes the interpretation of results 
more difficult. For instance, if firms without large investor are found to be associated 
with poorer performance, one can argue that investors are probably attracted to firms with 
better outlook. Does the relation merely reflect underlying investor preference? Does it 
mean that lower ownership concentration is an inferior arrangement, while it could just 
be the case that there is little room for improvement hence tighter control is not 
necessary. Due to the presumption of existing large stakes, the empirical studies do not 
provide a complete picture of the relationship between ownership structure and 
monitoring, and leave open the question of what motivates large shareholding. As 
examples of the empirical studies in this line, McConnell and Servaes (1990), Holderness 
and Sheehan (1988) link institutional ownership to firm profitability and shareholder 
value. Among them, some rely on event-study methods to examine excess returns around 
the announcement date of outsiders’ large equity acquisitions (such as Mikkelson and 
Ruback (1985), Holderness and Sheehan (1985), Barclay and Holderness (1991). In 
general no significant abnormal returns are found. Some studies examine the market 
reaction to shareholder proxy proposal submission or other public targeting methods. 
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Using publicly observable activity as evidence of control offers a direct measure for 
monitoring, but is also subject to certain limitations3. 
 
Other than firm performance, studies have also looked at whether large investor presence 
has an impact on real decision making of firms, especially on the extent of agency 
problems. Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), and 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) examine managerial incentives, and find that the existence of 
large investors is negatively associated with manager’s discretion to set their own pay. 
Bushee (1998) shows that institutional ownership correlates to smaller chance of 
managers myopically cutting R&D expenses to meet short-run earnings benchmarks. In a 
study of U.S. M&A activities, Qiu (2008) uses instrumental variable approach and finds 
that the presence of large public pension fund ownership discourages managers acquiring 
others firms, especially in cash-rich firms. These studies all show that large investor helps 
mitigate agency problems, but are silent on whether existing agency problems attract 
large shareholding to solve the problems. 
 
There exists a smaller literature that explores the endogenous determination of block 
ownership. Himmelberg et al (1999) focus exclusively on managerial stock ownership. 
They show that the level of managerial ownership is endogenously determined by the 
scope of moral hazard problems4. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) acknowledge the benefits of 
control as one important determinant of ownership concentration, and show how 
ownership concentration varies systematically with firm characteristics for a cross-
section of large U.S. firms during 1976-1980. 
 
There are some major differences that distinguish this study. First, institutional investors 
are not only important for studying U.S. ownership structure nowadays, but also serve as 
a good benchmark for studying the motivation for large holdings. We can not learn much 
                                                 
3 Under the circumstance that control takes the form of private communication between the management 
and the investor, the extent of activism may be understated. On the other hand, a public targeting method 
such as proposal submission may signal that the communication with incumbent manager fails or problems 
are harder to fix, and cause negative market reaction to the event. 
4 Among the measures are firm size, scopes of discretionary spending (proxied by R&D, advertisement 
spending), and risk. 
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of what determines the block holding by financial institutions from Himmelberg et al 
(1999) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985), either because the data covered the time before 
institutional ownership became important, or due to a small perspective of ownership 
structure under study (managerial ownership). Secondly, monitoring activities could 
contain helping set the proper managerial incentives, among many other things. As 
Himmelberg et al (1999) show, level of managerial incentive results from an equilibrium 
contractual arrangement that reflects the existence of moral hazard problems. However, 
the incentive scheme is only one of the possible outcomes that can infer the effects of 
monitoring. A more general question therefore is: are investors more likely to monitor 
when moral hazard problems are more serious? If so, is there any evidence of monitoring 
activity? This is what this study tries to answer. I provide evidence of monitoring by 
checking a list of variables that may gauge the outcomes of monitoring, in case firm 
profitability is too noisy as a measure for monitoring.   
2.3 Determinants of Institutional Holding -- Theoretical Framework 
It has been widely recognized that the separation of ownership and control is associated 
with agency problems, because self-interested corporate managers tend to make decisions 
that are not in the best interests of shareholders. A conventional case is about manager’s 
effort provision, since providing effort generates private cost for the mangers while most 
of the benefits accrue to the shareholders5. Another common scenario of agency conflicts 
arises with acquisitions that reduce bidder shareholder value, which happens when 
unconstrained managers enjoy building empires instead of investing in the best interest of 
the shareholders. 
 
Earlier studies suggest that the existence of agency problems has negative impact on 
future firm value6. The study of corporate governance is centered on the problem of how 
to minimize the costs related to agency conflicts. To understand when monitoring 
                                                 
5 The issue of managerial shirking is reflected from the observations that mangers often seek “quiet life”.  
For example, they forego positive net present value investment projects because investments impose 
private cost on the managers (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), 
Bohren et al (2007)).  
6 An example is the study by Gompers et al (2003). 
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becomes more valuable and when institutional investors establish large stakes to monitor, 
it is important to recognize the simultaneous existence of alternative control mechanisms. 
The theoretical framework for this study is adapted from Holmstrom’s well-known 
theory of monitoring which shows that monitoring adds value by reducing the 
information asymmetry problem. From there, I derive investor’s net benefit from 
monitoring, and identify the exogenous factors that influence investor’s incentive to 
acquire large stake and monitor. 
2.3.1 The Agency Problem 
Benchmark Case 
First recall the conventional incentive provision problem with information asymmetry 
and differential risk tolerance between the principal (owner) and the agent (manager). As 
usual, assume that owners are risk-neutral. This assumption can be justified if owners 
hold well-diversified portfolios.   
 
The risk-averse manager chooses effort e and receives w in compensation. Her cost of 
effort is given by
2
)(
2eeC = . Assume her utility takes the form of ))((1 eCwrM MeU
−−−= , 
where Mr  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The manager’s outside option gives 
her a reservation utility of 0, and she has no bargaining power. 
 
The firm’s profit is determined by manager’s effort input and a random shock: ε+= ey , 
where ),0(~ 2εσε N . Without monitoring, firm profit is the only verifiable signal on 
which the compensation contract can be based. The manager’s pay contract takes the 
form yw 10 ββ += . 
 
Manager chooses her effort taking the contract terms as given, at a level 1
* β=e . The 
manager’s negative exponential utility function allows us to write the certainty-equivalent 
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The owner’s maximization problem is to choose the set of parameters of pay contracts 
that maximizes ][ wyE − subject to manager’s incentive constraint 1
* β=e and 
participation constraint 0=MCE . Under this standard construction, the solution of 












































The main implication from this model is that the principal and agent have to compromise 
between optimal provision of incentives and optimal allocation of risk. When there exist 
gains from insurance, the first best outcome (in which e* = 1) is generally not achievable. 
As the manager becomes more risk-averse (represented by higher Mr ), weaker incentive 
will be provided. And the more severe the asymmetry of information (higher 2εσ ), the 
weaker the incentive; in the extreme, the manger’s pay should not be based on the signal 
when it does not tell owners anything about the performance of the manager. Meanwhile 
the manager demands a higher risk premium (in the form of 0β ) as a compensation for 
being exposed to firm risk. The need for insurance therefore creates agency cost. 
However, this agency problem can be mitigated with owners who monitor. 
 
With Monitoring 
Monitoring refers to the activities to help better infer managerial inputs beyond the 
publicly observable firm profit. Monitoring activity in this context includes gathering 
information, or researching about the management. Suppose the monitor can observe a 
second signal of managerial effort input ues += , where ),0(~ 2uNu σ . The 
informativeness principle from Holmstrom (1979) implies that the signal should be 
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incorporated into the incentive contract as long as it contains additional information about 
managerial effort. This is the case when ε  and u are not perfectly correlated. For 
simplicity, assume the correlation between them is zero.  
 





0 βββ ++= . 
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These equations imply that the weight assigned to one signal in the compensation 
contract is smaller when the signal is noisier (or when the other signal is less noisy), as 
the signal becomes less informative and only introduces more risk exposure to the 
manager. In the extreme, when monitoring is perfectly revealing, i.e. es = , the contract 
will be based solely on signal s: ew "1
"
0 ββ += .  In this special case, the optimal contract 
becomes: 
[2.5] 1"*1 =β  and 2
1"*
0 −=β . 
The first-best effort level is achieved: 1"* =e , and the owner’s expected payoff becomes 





It is easy to show that monitoring adds firm value by improving performance incentives. 
This is because monitoring helps tie managerial rewards more closely to manager’s actual 
performance rather than to firm profit, which is usually influenced by random events 
outside the control of managers. This can be shown by a positive change in firm’s 
























The owner will find it beneficial to monitor if her expected payoff with monitoring 
exceeds that from not monitoring: 
**













2.3.2 The Decision to Monitor  
The decision to monitor depends on her relative wellbeing under monitoring and not-
monitoring. The extent of existing agency problems lowers the benchmark return and 
could increase the incentive to monitor. 
 
Firm-specific Risk 
From [2.7], it follows that the net benefit of monitoring increases with risk ( 2εσ ). This is 
because when there is little uncertainty, firm performance is fully revealing of managerial 
effort and the information asymmetry problem is less severe, it would not pay for 
institutions to monitor; when uncertainty becomes greater, it is harder for the owner (or 
the market) to determine whether a bad firm outcome is due to manager being lazy or 
some unfavorable shock.  
 
However, when significant shareholding is a prerequisite for credible monitoring, the 
impact of potential diversion from diversification on the incentive to monitor should be 
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also considered. Monitoring has public-good property and is subject to the free-riding 
problem in public companies with dispersed ownership. Large shareholding can enhance 
the incentive to monitor by internalizing the benefit from monitoring. Credible 
monitoring thus requires large shareholding; however, this may force financial 
institutions to forego some benefits from diversification. The risk-neutrality assumption 
justified by well-diversified owner fails to capture an investor that monitors. 
 
To illustrate the implication this may have on the monitoring decision, the above 
monitoring problem is modified for a risk-averse owner (as in Heinrich (2002)). The 















From [2.8], firm-specific uncertainty (or firm risk, given by 2εσ ) affects the monitoring 
decision but the effect is less straightforward. Higher risk has two countervailing effects 
on the incentive to monitor. First, firm risk makes providing performance incentive more 
costly, hence monitoring becomes more valuable. When there is little uncertainty, firm 
profit or stock return fully reveals managerial performance; there remains little room for 
monitoring. While uncertainty increases, it becomes more difficult for the market to 
determine whether firm performance is driven by managerial effort or by exogenous 
factors; the agency problem becomes more acute. Secondly, higher firm risk exposes the 
investor to more risk when she holds a significant stake for monitoring purposes. I expect 
this cost of holding large stake varies with the level of risk itself, or with the size of the 
firm. At lower level of uncertainty, the cost of risk-bearing may be low relative to the 
benefit from monitoring; while at higher level of risk, the cost of risk-bearing may 
dominate. Firm size could reflect the share of wealth that the financial institution put into 
the given firm. The larger the firm, a given stake will imply a larger share of wealth, and 
greater risk exposure for the institutional investor. 
 
Takeover Threat  
The market for corporate control can be a solution for agency problems through hostile 
takeovers. In a hostile takeover the raider makes an offer to buy all or a fraction of 
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outstanding shares at a stated price. The takeover is successful if the raider obtains more 
than 50% of the voting shares which grants him effective control of the company and 
thus be able to appoint manager. In the literature for takeovers as solution for agency 
problems, takeover is generally modeled to change the distribution of information 
between the owners and managers. For example, Scharfstein (1988) shows takeover 
threats add value when prospective raiders gain informational advantage over incumbent 
shareholders7. There also exist models of takeover as source of extra agency costs. The 
counter-argument involves takeover threats inducing managerial myopia that leads to 
efficiency loss (in terms of sacrificed long term firm value): since the benefit partly goes 
to the new management, takeover induces manager to under-invest in profitable long-
term projects with delayed returns. 
 
Despite the different views towards takeover, existing empirical evidence converges to 
support the disciplinary view of takeover threats on firm management. In the current 
context, the existence of an active takeover market can translate to smaller net benefits of 
monitoring. In a setup where takeover threat discourages manager underperformance, I 
show how the incentive to monitor changes with the presence of takeover threat, and how 
this relationship is affected by legislative hurdles to takeovers. For takeovers presenting a 
threat to the manager, managers are allowed to earn firm-specific rent. Otherwise the 
manager can earn the same amount elsewhere in case he gets fired following a change in 
control, and therefore has no incentive to avoid being fired. Moreover for takeover threats 
to elicit greater effort from the manager, assume takeovers happen with positive 
probability and the probability of successful takeover depends on the market price of the 
firm without a takeover, such that by working harder, the manager can raise the market 
price and reduce the takeover risk. 
 
                                                 
7 Inefficiency arises when managers have private information about the environment in which the firm 
operates, and the manger is not penalized enough for shirking because of the insurance provided by his 




Suppose the manager is able to extract rent R with the current firm. This could be the case 
when the manager has bargaining power8. The takeover threat is introduced after the 
contracting stage. The raider will be able to implement the first-best effort e = 1 after 
takeover and becoming the new manager. The cost of takeover T is stochastic and follows 
a normal distribution function ),( 2υμF . Suppose the raider, in order to successfully take 




0][ ββ eewyE −−=− , with the contract terms given. She will then take over the firm 
iff Te >+−− '0
'












. Taking the contract terms given, the manager can increase 
her effort level in order to reduce the takeover risk, up to the level where the marginal 
benefit of an effort increase Rep *)('  equals the marginal cost due to extra effort )(' eC . 
Takeover threat thus improves performance incentives. This will leave less room for 
improvement. For the potential investors, the return as a non-monitoring owner is rather 
high and would not pay for the investors to monitor. When a takeover threat is not 
present, the agency problem persists. Shareholder monitoring can potentially improve 
incentive provision and add value. Therefore the incentive for institutional investors to 
acquire large stake and monitor increases. 
 
The institutional changes toward stronger anti-takeover protection introduced an 
exogenous shock to costs for successful takeovers. If the change is treated as mean-
shifting in the takeover cost distribution function, a higher μ implies that a smaller 
increase in effort is needed for the same reduction in takeover risk, and leaves more room 
for monitoring.   
 
In addition to the two major parameters discussed here, there are other parameters in the 
model that can affect investor’s decision to monitor. They include manager’s risk 
averseness rm and monitoring cost M. However, these variables are not easy to measure. 
                                                 




The model does not consider investor’s wealth constraint, because it is not as important 
for institutional investors9. 
2.4 Empirical Framework and Results 
From the above theoretical framework, I derive the decision rule by the investor to 
monitor and identify several factors that can move the potential benefits from monitoring. 
Since large shareholding is a prerequisite for credible monitoring, I now estimate how 
firm’s likelihood of having a large institution varies with the variables identified in the 
previous section. The estimation problem is formulated as follows. 
 
In any given period, we observe a binary variable whether there exists any large 
institutional investor in a firm. The outcome of the variable y depends on the net benefit 
of monitoring being non-negative: )0(1 * ≥= yy , where 1(.) is the indicator function. Net 
benefit *y  is a function of determinants, and define the function in a linear 
form δβ += '* xy , ,...),)(,( 222 orx εε σσ= . Under standard normal distribution assumption 
for δ , this breaks down to estimating a probit model )'()|1Pr( βxxy Φ== . 
2.4.1 Measurement 
From the theoretical framework, I have identified firm risk and the strength of takeover 
pressure as two major determinants for the monitoring incentives. These two factors 
affect the severity of agency problems and thus the room for improvements through 
shareholder monitoring. Here I discuss the measurement issues of these variables, as well 
as other firm characteristics that also influence the scope of agency problems. 
 
The theoretical framework implies that the disturbance term in firm profit ( 2εσ ) has 
countervailing effects on the incentive to monitor. To measure the degree of uncertainty, 
only firm-specific shocks are relevant. This is because if the shock to firm profit is only 
due to some market-wide systematic risks that are common to all firms, relative firm 
                                                 
9 The average size of institutions is 7 times the average size of firms in our sample. 
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performance will still be fully revealing of managerial input and incentive provisions are 
less of a concern. This in turn gives little room for shareholder monitoring. Firm specific 
risk (or idiosyncratic risk; the terms are used interchangeably) is calculated by taking the 
standard deviation of firm’s residual stock return (the residual term of a CAPM 
regression of daily stock return on market return). The residual reflects firm return after 
separating the co-variation with the market, or the idiosyncratic component of daily stock 
return. 
 
I have also shown that the incentive to monitor is greater when the takeover threat is 
missing: in the presence of takeover threats, the incentive for institutional investors to 
monitor is rather low; and when takeover pressure does not exist, shareholding 
monitoring can improve performance incentives and investors will find monitoring more 
rewarding. The strength of anti-takeover defenses can serve as a proxy for the lack of 
takeover threat. 
 
Most U.S. states introduced anti-takeover legislations in the late 1980s following the 
hostile takeover wave. One focus of the legislations was to limit what bidders can do. For 
example, “business combination” statutes restrict the right of a successful bidder to 
merge with, break up, or liquidate the target firm, which particularly deters highly 
leveraged bids; “fair price” statutes raise the costs of takeovers, by requiring the bidder to 
pay all shareholders the highest price paid to any during a specific time period and thus 
ruling out two-tier offers10. The legislations also allowed management to adopt defensive 
tactics, such as poison pills. The arrangements in poison pills give the shareholders (other 
than the bidder) the right to purchase stock at a steep discount, making the target 
unattractive or diluting the acquirer’s voting power. Among the other common provisions 
are supermajority amendments11, special meeting limitations12, classified board13, and 
                                                 
10 In which a higher price is offered for the first shares tendered and thus induces shareholders to tender. 
11 This amendment raises the majority rule above 50% -- typically from 66% to 80% -- for a merger to be 
approved. 
12 The limits restrict or eliminate shareholders’ ability to call special meetings. Such provisions add extra 
time to proxy fights. 
13 This defense staggers the terms and elections of directors and can be used to slow down a hostile 
takeover. It postpones the time at which the raider can gain full control of the board after a takeover. 
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golden parachutes14. These amendments in general make it more costly to successfully 
complete a hostile tender offer. Their effect on actual takeovers and takeover attempts is 
studied for instance by Borokhovich et al (1997), which suggests that many protections 
were adopted at the beginning of a concerted effort to deter takeover. Their findings show 
these efforts are effective, as the firms that adopted anti-takeover defenses received 
significantly fewer takeover bids during the years following the adoption than the control 
firms. Regarding the effect of the anti-takeover defenses on managerial incentives, the 
studies in general support the view of takeover threats as disciplinary devices 15 (for 
example, Meulbroek et al (1990) reports evidence that R&D efforts decline following the 
adoption of anti-takeover amendments; research by Borokhovich et al (1997), Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (1999) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) found that the anti-
takeover defenses help managers receive above-market compensation levels and enjoy 
“quiet life”). The implication is therefore, when disciplinary takeover threats do not exist 
because of the institutional arrangements, shareholder monitoring becomes more 
important to improve incentive provision. Another possible venue for shareholder 
activism is to facilitate takeovers. This could happen when large shareholders help 
weaken anti-takeover defenses, also takeovers are easier to complete with more 
concentrated shareholdings. 
 
To quantify the lack of takeover threats, I adopt the governance index developed by 
Gompers et al (2003). The index groups the 22 firm-level anti-takeover related 
amendments and 6 state anti-takeover laws intro five categories: tactics for delaying 
hostile bids (such as classified board and special meeting), voting rights (such as 
supermajority), director/officer protection (e.g., golden parachutes), state laws (such as 
business combination laws) and other takeover defenses. The index adds up the number 
                                                 
14 These are severance payments (cash and non-cash) to senior executive upon a change in corporate 
control and do not require shareholder approval.   
15 We discussed earlier of the alternative view towards the ex ante efficiency of takeovers, that takeover 
may be a source of extra agency costs. The discussion is also related to the motivation of the anti-takeover 
defenses. In an efficient contracting view, some anti-takeover provisions can be justified as a means of re-
establishing managerial incentives to pursue long term objectives. In an entrenchment view, the defenses 
are put in place by managers of firms with weak corporate governance structures and are against 
shareholders’ interest: by making it more costly for shareholders to replace management through voting, it 
increases the ability of managers to engage in self-serving behavior at the expense of shareholders. 
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of anti-takeover provisions and laws for each firm, assuming different amendments or 
laws are essentially equivalent16. A higher index, as the authors suggest, reflects weaker 
discipline of the managers from the outside control market. As a result, un-disciplined 
managers are able to effectively seize control of the board to make favorable decisions at 
the cost of shareholders. They find positive correlation between the governance index and 
investment measures (capital expenditure and acquisition frequency), and interpret it as 
evidence for excessive agency cost associated with the anti-takeover protections.  
   
I identify several firm level control variables that are related to the extent of agency 
problems. The moral hazard problem in the theoretical context can be exaggerated when 
there are a lot of investment opportunities around for the firm – with managerial shirking 
(or sometimes labeled by seeking “quiet life”), firms may forego some investment 
projects of positive present value; firms with more investment opportunities thus suffer 
more from managerial shirking than those with fewer opportunities. A few studies have 
shown the tendency of under-investing instead of the usual assumption that managers 
tend to over-invest (“empire-building”). For instance, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) 
studies the goals pursued by managers when they face weak discipline from the takeover 
market, and find that managers prefer a “quiet life” instead of building empires. Bohren 
et al (2007) also find that better corporate governance not only pushes a higher level of 
investment but also improves investment efficiency (that investment becomes more in 
line with investment opportunities and less sensitive to internal financial constraints). 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) show that the equilibrium relationships between 
compensation incentives, investment and firm performance are consistent with models of 
underinvestment in which managers have private costs of investment. However, “quiet 
life” may be less of a concern if there is abundant internal cash such that managers do not 
have to actively pursue external funding for the opportunities. A common measure for 
investment opportunities is Tobin’s Q, which equals to the ratio of market value of assets 
                                                 
16 The study by Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) documented that different types of amendments had various 
effect on the share price of the firms announcing amendments.  Non fair price amendments on average had 
significant negative effect, while the fair price amendment had insignificant effect. 
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to the book value of assets 17 . Although free cash flow is not directly observable, 
presumably it is correlated with operating income. 
 
An alternative form of agency problems related to investment is the free cash flow 
problem introduced by Jensen. In Jensen’s free cash flow theory, managers derive private 
benefit from controlling more assets and tend to take wasteful unprofitable projects 
(“empire-building”). The free cash flow a firm possesses therefore opens up opportunities 
for discretionary spending and could imply higher agency cost. The theory also predicts 
that firms with more free cash but less investment opportunities tend to waste more of it; 
thereby cash-rich low-growth opportunities firms suffer even greater agency costs. A 
large investor has a potential role in reducing the agency problems related to wasteful 
spending by differentiating the quality of projects and discouraging managers from 
selecting bad ones (thus improving overall investment quality). On the other hand, the 
free cash flow problem can also be mitigated by debt and dividend, because the cash 
payout requirement can curb manager’s ability of discretionary spending.  
 
Larger firms may be subject to higher agency cost (Himmelberg et al (1999)). Meanwhile 
from the previous discussions, firm size may reflect more of risk aversion 
considerations18, since holding large stakes in larger firms is more costly than owning the 
same percentage in smaller corporations. And I expect the risk consideration is more 
important than the monitoring consideration. Therefore firm size has a negative effect on 
the tendency to hold large stakes.   
2.4.2 Data Description 
I draw the sample from CompuStat, CDA/Spectrum, and IRRC datasets for the years 
1992-2001. The CompuStat dataset covers a universe of around 2700 firms (including 
                                                 
17 Alternatively, the ratio of sales to capital is used in other studies to avoid the potential mispricing 
problem of stocks associated with the market to book ratio of assets.  Average sales growth in the previous 
years has also been used to proxy for future growth. 
18 In previous studies such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), the consideration of firm size is motivated by 
controlling for investor’s wealth constraint. In the context of institutional investors, wealth constraint 
concern is less important because of the size of the institutional investors (those in the sample are at least 7 
times as large as the invested firms). 
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S&P 1500 firms) with detailed information of the balance sheet items. Stock return 
information is obtained from CRSP. Thomson Financial's CDA/Spectrum 13f dataset 
contains quarterly shareholding information for all 13f institutions 19  in over 4300 
companies. From this data, I am able to identify large shareholdings by institutional 
investors in each sample firm. I extract annual holding information using reported 
holding of the quarter ending on June 31st, the quarter ending on December 31st, and the 
average holding among the 4 quarters.  
 
Table 2.1 shows the overall trends in both total institutional ownership (in percentage 
term) and percent of firms with block institutional ownership, for a merged sample from 
the above mentioned sources with 12400 firm-year observations. Overall institutional 
holdings grew from 46% in 1993 to 60% in 2001 of firm’s outstanding equity. As the 
overall holdings have grown, large holdings by institutional investors have also become 
more common from the beginning of the sample period toward the later years. In 1993, 
about one third of the firms did not have large institution with at least 5% block 
ownership. Then in 2001 only 22% of the firms did not have block institution20. 
 
The governance index is obtained from Investor Responsibilities Research Center 
covering S&P 1500 companies. To ensure that the same voting rights are attached to the 
stocks within the same firm, I exclude a small number of firms with two or more classes 
of common stock (with different voting schemes attached). For every other year, IRRC 
reports governance data including the takeover defense provisions of firms, state takeover 
laws, and the governance index based on Gompers et al (2003). For years not reported I 
use the most adjacent-year information. The index is calculated based on the number of 
24 unique21 firm-level provisions and state anti-takeover laws, with one point represents 
the existence of each provision/law. 
 
                                                 
19 13f institutions include all types of investment companies that are required to file Form 13f with the SEC 
within 45 days after the last day of every quarter.  Institutional investment managers with over $100 million 
in equity portfolio are required to file, and must report all holdings in excess of 10,000 shares and/or with a 
market value over $200,000. 
20 If we look at 10% block ownership, less than 30% have large institution. 
21 They consider firm anti-takeover amendment and state law with the same function as one unit. 
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The firm-specific idiosyncratic risk is calculated based on the residual standard deviation 
from the CAPM regression of daily stock returns on the market return. Since the market 
return has very small variation in the sample period, the derived firm specific risk 
measure is very similar to the annualized stock volatility measure from the CRSP data 
(standard deviation of stock return over the past 60 months). Investment opportunity or 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of assets, which equals market value of equity 
(CompuStat item #199 * item #25) plus book value of liabilities (item #6 - item #60), 
over the book value of assets (item #6). I use the market value of equity as the 
measurement for firm size. Free cash flow is proxied by the ratio of earnings (item #18 + 
item #14) to assets. I also use the ratio of leverage, defined by total debt (item #9 + item 
#34) divided by asset, and the ratio of dividend (item #21) to total assets as controls for 
firm’s capital structure. 
 
After merging the different datasets for the period 1992-2001 and dropping the firm-year 
pairs without observations on the main variables (those identified in the last section for 
the comparative analysis), I get a final sample for regression analysis with nearly 6740 
firm-year observations for some 1380 firms. Firms are missing half observations over the 
years due to two main reasons. First, since I am using lagged variables to predict the 
variation in institutional holding, the first year observations will be excluded. Secondly 
and as a more significant source of missing observations, IRRC does not have 
information on anti-takeover related measures for some of the firms. And since I 
interpolate the anti-takeover index variable only based on the adjacent report-year 
information, about 4000 firm-year observations are lost. On top of the two main sources 
for missing year observations, stock return information is not available in some years due 
to de-listing, and hence a small number of observations are missing on the firm 
idiosyncratic risk which is derived based on daily stock return data. I examine the 
potential selection problem by comparing the sample used in regression analysis and the 
full sample along main firm characteristics. In fact, the firms used in the regression are 
larger on average, with higher overall institutional ownership and lower investment 
opportunities. Later as robustness check I test the main qualitative results are not affected 




Focusing on the final sample, the summary statistics for the main firm characteristics is 
presented in Table 2.3. The median value of firm equity is about $1845 million and 
median total assets are valued at about $1872 million (in 1992 dollar). The governance 
index has a median value of 10, and the variable does not vary much over time (not 
shown in the table) during our sample period since most of the adoptions clustered at the 
end of 1980s. On average, institutions hold almost 60% of the outstanding shares for 
sample firms, and 76% of the firms have large institution. Table 2.4 provides the 
correlation coefficients between large institutional presence indicator and selected 
variables that serve as the measures for monitoring needs. The directions of correlations 
are largely consistent with our expectations.  The indicator for large institutional presence 
is positively and significantly correlated to the level of firm idiosyncratic risk. It is 
correlated to the size of firm negatively and significantly. The correlations with anti-
takeover measure and with cash flow are of expected signs, but are not significant.  
2.4.3 Estimation and Results 
I have motivated the establishment of large shareholding as related to monitoring, and 
identified the factors that encourages or discourages monitoring. The main testable 
relationships are: (1) large shareholdings become relatively more attractive with higher 
firm-specific risk, but becomes less so at higher level of risk due to increasing cost 
associated with institutions being further deviated from perfect diversification; large 
holding becomes less attractive at larger firms, as the cost due to risk bearing increases 
with firm size which also partly reflects the relative size of holdings to the institution’s 
total wealth; (2) the tendency of large shareholding increases with the lack of takeover 
threat measured by the prevalence of anti-takeover protections; (3) controlling for risk 
and anti-takeover protections, large shareholding is more attractive at firms with more 
free cash flow; and the relationship is even stronger when firms with greater cash flow 
also face less investment opportunities. I thus examine the decision to acquire large 
shares by the institutional investors, based on their observation of the state of firms and 
evaluation of the benefits versus costs of monitoring. Empirically, the state of 
institutional shareholdings (whether there exists at least one block holder, where block is 
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defined as 5% of the outstanding equity) in year t is estimated as a function of the 
variables in year t-1. The focus in this study is the existence of ANY block holder, 
instead of the number of block holders. 
 
The timeline of our empirical analysis is as follows: 
          





where the dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if there exists at 
least one large institution for firm i in year t. The Risk variable is firm idiosyncratic risk 
(for interpretation purpose I use the empirical cumulative distribution of the variable 
)(RiskΦ in the regression). Risk2 term helps capture the countervailing effects of firm-
specific risk on the incentive of large shareholding – at higher level of risk, the cost of 
large shareholding can offset the benefit of better monitoring. I therefore expect 1β  to be 
positive and 2β  negative. AT stands for the anti-takeover protections with an expected 
positive coefficient. Log(MVEQ) is the log of market value of equity and I expect its 
coefficient to be negative. The ratio of cash flow controls for the agency cost arising from 
discretionary spending, and its interaction with Tobin’s Q allows for varying agency cost 
when cash-rich firms are faced with different levels of investment opportunities. I 
expect 5β  to be positive and a negative 7β , as monitoring is more desirable at firms with 
high cash flow and low investment opportunities. Variable Capital measures firm’s 
capital structure such as debt and dividend payout, which is usually considered as a 
State of shareholding observed: 
Probability (having ANY 5% 
block institutional investor); etc 
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solution to the free cash flow problem -- by keeping managers on a steady payout and 
thus reducing the cash flow available for discretionary spending, these instruments help 
limit the agency problem for instance associated with empire-building. I would expect 
shareholder monitoring has similar disciplinary effect as capital structure, if monitoring 
helps detect the ex ante quality of potential investment projects and prevents managers 
from pursuing bad deals. However, prior empirical evidence usually finds a positive 
correlation between ownership concentration and the level of debt. Year effects are 
captured by year dummies YD to control for the overall trend in large institutional 
holding over time. 
 
Table 2.5 summarizes the results from estimating the probit regression in [2.9]. The 
coefficients shown reflect the estimated marginal effects on the probability of having any 
large institution. The estimates overall are consistent with the predictions. 
 
Firms are more likely to have large institutional investors when firm-specific risk 
increases. The tendency to have large institutions grows slower with risk level. For 
instance, a rise in risk level from 25th percentile to the median is related to a 7 
percentage-point increase (from 0.12 to 0.19) in likelihood; whereas an increase in risk 
from the median to the 75th percentile only correlates to a 2 percentage-point higher 
likelihood (from 0.19 to 0.21). Then at certain levels of uncertainty (around the 70th 
percentile of risk variable) the positive relationship reverses. This is consistent with the 
theory that cost of risk bearing offsets the benefit from close monitoring and deters 
monitoring, when risk is sufficiently high. 
 
I’ve shown that the incentive to monitor rises with the lack of takeover threat. The results 
show as the anti-takeover protections measure grows larger, large institutional holding 
becomes more likely. The effect is quite small in magnitude though: one more anti-
takeover related firm provision or state law is related to less than 1 percentage-point 
increase in the likelihood of having a large institutional investor. However, this effect 




I have discussed the two possible effects of firm size on the incentive for large 
institutional holding: on one hand, large shareholding in a larger firm at any given risk 
level may imply more deviation from diversification; and on the other hand, agency 
issues could be graver in larger firms and retaining control makes more sense. The results 
show that larger firms are less likely to have large institutional investors – a one percent 
increase in market value of outstanding equity is related to 0.5 percentage-point decrease 
in the tendency of large institutional holding, at the significance level of 1%. This implies 
the cost from holding large stakes in a larger firm dominates the value arising from 
tighter control. 
 
As discussed earlier, there are two possible sources of agency problems related to 
investment: “quiet life” and “empire building”. Growth opportunities amplify the moral 
hazard problem due to managers seeking “quiet life”, but the effect may diminish with 
the availability of internal cash. Therefore we would expect monitoring becomes more 
valuable, and large institutional investor is more likely to exist, with more growth 
opportunities. However, the agency problems arising from managerial slacking at firms 
with more investment opportunities could be alleviated with the internal cash available, 
as managers seeking quiet life may be reluctant to raise external funds to avoid the 
scrutiny and invest only when internal funds are available. The estimated coefficients of 
Tobin’s Q ( 6β̂  = 0.01, with p-value < 0.05) and of the interaction term Tobin’s Q * Cash 
Flow Ratio ( 7β̂  = -0.09, with p-value < 0.01) confirm the “quiet life” concern
22. Under 
the “empire building” hypothesis, firms are more likely to engage in wasteful investment, 
especially in cash-rich firms with less investment opportunities. These firms are subject 
to higher agency cost and thus merit closer monitoring through large holding. The 
estimates from Table 2.5 are also consistent with the “empire building” hypothesis. Cash 
flow itself has an estimated effect of 0.56 (with p-value < 0.01) on the probability of large 
shareholding. This means an increase in cash flow ratio from the 25th percentile to the 
                                                 
22 Note that the coefficient of interaction terms in probit model does not give cross-partial derivative of the 
probability with respect to the interacted variables. In some situations, it may not have the same sign as 
predicted by the linear model. As a specification check, I also run the regression in a linear probability 




median translates to an increase of 2 percentage points (0.56*(0.09-0.05) = 0.02) in 
likelihood of having large institution. After allowing for interaction between cash flow 
and investment opportunities, the likelihood becomes more sensitive to cash flow at 
lower level of investment opportunities ( 7β̂  = -0.09, with p-value < 0.01). 
 
Debt and dividend ratios are included as alternative discipline for empire building. By 
saying so, we would expect both variables are negatively related to the tendency of 
having large institutional holding. I find that higher leverage ratio is positively related to 
the likelihood of having large institutional holding ( LEVβ̂ = 0.08, with p-value < 0.01), 
and dividend negatively related ( DIVβ̂ = -0.7, with p-value =0.01)
23. The relationship 
between debt and ownership is puzzling, yet in line with prior findings. However, 
explaining this empirical puzzle goes beyond the main thesis of the current study. 
 
Overall the estimates for regression [2.9] are quite consistent with the predictions from 
the theory: institutional investors acquire large holdings where monitoring is valuable. 
2.4.4 Over-Time Change in Ownership Structure   
I also present time-series evidence of large institutional holding as determined by the 
firm’s monitoring needs. Table 2.6 presents the estimated marginal effects on the 
probability of having additional large institutions over time from the Probit regression.  
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking value one if the number of block 
institution holders increases over time, and equaling zero otherwise. I include the 
existence of large institution in the previous period as an additional proxy for the 
expected return of monitoring. The regression specification remains otherwise the same 
as in equation [2.9]. I observe existing large institutional investor has indeed deterred 
others to acquire large stakes, consistent with the hypothesis that the return to monitoring 
would be lower for incoming institutional investors. Meanwhile, the possibility to attract 
block institutional investor still responds to the measures for benefit of monitoring, 
                                                 
23 The capital structure variables are endogenous and may contaminate the other estimates. Dropping them 
from the regression does not change results significantly. 
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controlling for existing institutional block ownership. However comparing to Table 2.5, 
the marginal effects of the variables (especially of Risk, Anti-takeover, Market Value and 
Cash Flow) are much smaller in the magnitude. A potential explanation is that other 
investors are expecting the incumbent large institution to do some monitoring24, but not 
sufficient. 
2.4.5 Robustness Checks 
The explanatory variables, especially with the anti-takeover defense measure, may be 
subject to endogeneity concerns. With the anti-takeover variable, the provisions that form 
the construction of the measure were chosen by firms25. Lagged independent variables 
help mitigate the concern to some degree. Furthermore, the findings in prior studies 
suggest that the endogeneity problem with this variable, if any, should lead us to under-
estimate the effects of takeover restrictions. In particular, Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), 
Brickley et al (1988) have found large institutional shareholders are more likely to vote 
against management-initiated anti-takeover amendments, especially those that hurt 
shareholder value (while insider holding has opposite effect on the adoption of the 
amendments). So even if we worry large institutional investors can select over anti-
takeover protections (or over unobserved firm characteristics related to the protections), 
they will prefer firms with less protections and will use their power to keep such 
provisions from being adopted. Therefore reverse causation can not explain our finding 
that stronger anti-takeover protections are associated with a higher probability of having 
large institutional holder.  
 
The firm-specific risk variable could be endogenous to the ownership structure as well. 
For example, large institutions cross-hold in firms and are less likely to sell their 
holdings, that tend to stabilize the stock prices at the cross-holding firms. However this 
                                                 
24 Evidence of monitoring is provided later in the paper. 
25 Alternatively we can rely only on the number of state laws to measure the strength of anti-takeover 
protections.  However the cross-section variation will be very small, given that there are only 6 state-level 
laws and almost half of the firms incorporated in Delaware.  Another possibility is to compare the holdings 
before and after the passage of state laws in Delaware, using other states as a control group.    
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will predict a negative relationship between large holding and idiosyncratic risk and 
implies our estimate is biased toward zero. 
 
I test whether the main results are sensitive to alternative ways of measuring large 
institutional ownership. The qualitative relationships are robust to using a continuous 
measure of institutional ownership concentration. When the holding variable is 
constructed, only the holding information of the last quarter in the calendar year is used; 
however results are very similar if using reported holding information in the middle of 
the year (end of the 2nd quarter), or using averages among the four quarters. 
 
I used interpolation to fill in the missing observations on the anti-takeover measure. In 
fact if I drop those years when the governance data was not reported by IRRC, regression 
results are similar. And since during sample selection a significant number of 
observations were lost because of the anti-takeover measure, I re-estimate the regression 
in [2.9] without this particular variable on the full sample and this does not cause large 
moves in the estimated coefficients of other variables.  
2.5 Evidence of Control 
I find that having large institutional holding is more likely where the benefit from 
monitoring is great relative to the forgone benefit from diversification, keeping other 
things constant. What, then happens, to the firm once the large institution is aboard? In 
the rest of the paper, I look for evidence of better monitoring at firms with large 
institutions. The purpose is to keep institution’s large stake holding motives in check. It 
helps rule out alternative explanations for large institutional holding: for example, 
Barclay and Holderness (1989) has documented evidence for private benefits associated 
with block institutions holding (such as consuming corporate resources through their 
voting power, describing benefits that are not shared among other shareholders)26, the 
magnitude of such private benefits could also be increasing with agency problems. 
 
                                                 
26 They show substantial premiums that large blocks are traded to the post-announcement exchange price, 
and that the premiums tend to be larger with the block size and firm performance before the trade. 
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Monitoring effort is hard to observe directly. A common measure for monitoring used in 
the literature is firm performance or shareholder value, although in general no strong 
correlation has been found. And similar to many existing studies, we find block 
institutional holding has insignificant effect on firm accounting profit27. The submission 
of shareholder proposals is sometimes considered as more direct evidence for monitoring; 
however the incident could also indicate the failure of initial control efforts within the 
firm. 
 
The focus here is more on investigating the possible mechanisms through which large 
institutions can potentially improve the firm’s status quo. Institutions can involve actively 
and affect real decision making, especially firm’s investment decisions. This is the case 
when institutions help investment becoming more aligned with the available 
opportunities. Institutions could also involve in a less active way, by facilitating value-
increasing takeovers. On one hand, large holding makes takeover easier because of the 
holding concentration. On the other hand, large institutions have the capability of voting 
to remove some of the anti-takeover related provisions. Therefore I look at both over-
time change in anti-takeover index and the actual incidence of being acquired at firms 
with large institutional investors. 
2.5.1 Firm Investment Decisions 
I have shown earlier that the likelihood of firms having large institutions responds to 
measures that capture the agency problems associated with investment choice (labeled by 
managers seeking “quiet life” or “empire building”). Here I examine whether large 
institution presence is associated with improved firm investment decisions, in particular, 
if manages invest more in line with available investment opportunities (as in Bohren et al 
(2007)). The following investment equation is estimated: 
[2.10] titititititi DebtaCashaInvOppaLaaInv ,1,41,31,21,10, ν+++++= −−−− . 
                                                 
27 The result is not tabulated but available on request. Firm performance measure in time t is regressed on 
indicator for the existence of large institutional investor in time t-1. I measure profitability by the return on 
assets (earnings divided by the book value of assets). The control variables include lagged values of firm 
size, R&D expenses and advertise expenses relative to sales (as in McConnell and Servaes (1990)), 
industry and years effects. 
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The dependent variable is the capital expenditure ratio (relative to the capital stock), and 
investment opportunity is proxied by Tobin’s Q as in regression [2.9]. The sensitivity of 
investment ratio to Tobin’s Q is allowed to vary between firms with and without large 
institution. The regression controls for firm’s financial constraints by including cash flow 
and leverage ratio. Lagged explanatory variables are used to reduce the effect of 
simultaneity. 
 
Table 2.7 reports the estimation results for equation [2.10], including year and firm fixed 
effects. There are two main observations for firm with large institutional holders, 
compared to similar firms without large institution. Firstly, investment is lower on 
average in firms with large institutional holder. Secondly, investment responds more 
steeply (about 60% steeper from the fixed effect estimation) to the measure of investment 
opportunities. The coefficients on the control variables have the expected signs as 
measures for financial constraint. Cash flow is positively related to investment ratio; 
while leverage ratio has a negative coefficient, which supports debt as a disciplinary force 
on firm investment28. 
 
I further evaluate the above equation for corporate M&A activities specifically. M&A 
reflects an important strategic decision and can have a substantial influence on firm 
value. Many studies have shown that M&A can be motivated by managerial incentives 
and reduce shareholder wealth. To measure firm’s acquisition behavior, SDC dataset 
provides specific information on domestic deals including the identity of acquirers and 
dates of announcement. Only completed transactions are included and after merging with 
the existing sample there are about 3350 cases of completed acquisitions for the period 
1995-2001. Sample firms that did not appear in the SDC data are considered as those 
without acquisition activities within the year. I use the specification in equation [2.10], 
this time the dependent variable becomes the indicator for acquisitions. As shown in 
Table 2.8, the estimated relationships are very similar qualitatively to those for capital 
                                                 
28 If we further allow investment-leverage sensitivity to vary across firms, the sensitivity is less negative at 
firms with large institution. This is consistent with large institution partly substitute for the disciplinary role 
of debt on investment. 
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expenditure: firms with large institutions are less likely to acquire other firms; moreover, 
the acquisition possibility is more aligned with the measure for investment opportunities. 
Combined with the observations for capital expenditure, the empirical relationships imply 
improved investment efficiency and less empire-building behavior at firms with large 
institutions. 
 
Some might argue that the above finding could be a result of institutions being attracted 
to firms with better investment efficiency (and less empire building). This endogeneity 
concern is very common in the corporate governance literature. I argue that this should 
not create too much concern, since we have already established that large institution is 
more likely to arise when the firm is in fact more prone to empire building, rather than 
less.    
2.5.2 Facilitating Takeovers? 
Institutions could also involve in a less active way, by facilitating value-increasing 
takeovers. This can occur in several ways. The existence of large holding already makes 
takeover easier because higher holding concentration helps resolve the free-riding issue 
in the takeover process. Further, large institutions have the capability of voting to remove 
anti-takeover related provisions. Prior findings in Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), Brickley et 
al (1988) have shown large institutional shareholders are more likely to vote against 
management initiated anti-takeover amendments. Here I check if large institution 
presence help weaken firm’s anti-takeover defense. 
 
In order to test this, I look at the future over-time change in anti-takeover index at firms 
with large institutional investors. Table 2.9 shows the results from examining the changes 
in firm’s total number of takeover-related provisions from year t-1 to t and from year t-1 
to t+1. The regressions control for firm size, the current number of provisions and year 
effects (results are very similar if firm fixed effects are included). The coefficient on the 
indicator variable for large institution implies large institution tends to have downward 




I also examine the actual incidence of being acquired for firms with large institutional 
investors. The SDC dataset provides detailed deal information for M&A activities. I only 
count the completed transactions and there are about 809 cases of completed acquisitions 
(being acquired) among sample firms for the period 1995-2001. Sample firms that were 
not recorded as targets in the SDC database are treated as no announcement had ever 
been made toward them. A dummy variable takes on 1 if announcement was made during 
the year (and the deal is successful later on) and 0 otherwise. Control variables are firm 
characteristics that may affect the acquisition likelihood such as firm size, prior firm 
performance and the cost of takeover (anti-takeover measure). Table 2.10 summarizes the 
results from the probit estimation for successful acquisition likelihood within a year. The 
coefficient of large institutional presence is not economically or statistically significant. It 
is probably because the facilitating effect due to large institutional holding is offset by the 
effect of a more efficient management that tends to discourage takeover bids. Overall we 
can not draw a conclusion that large institutions actually facilitate takeovers. And it also 
makes the argument that institutions simply choose to hold large position where firms are 
more likely to be takeover targets less credible. 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper presents empirical evidence that large stakes by institutional investors are 
endogenously determined, and, in particular, that they arise to resolve the agency issues 
within firms. Using measures for the benefit of monitoring directly related to agency 
problems, and the cost of monitoring in terms of foregone benefit from diversification, I 
find the benefit and cost of monitoring explain the cross-firm variations in large 
institutional holdings. The results confirm earlier studies that ownership structure is 
endogenous and reflects the outcome of investor’s optimization problem. I then 
investigate the venues through which large institutions improve the status quo. Large 
institutions are linked to less empire building behavior, as evident in both capital 
expenditure and acquisition activities. I do not find strong evidence for large institutions 
facilitating value-increasing takeovers, although they do have small negative effect on 
firm’s takeover defense. Together with the result that institutions choose to acquire large 
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holdings in firms where their monitoring could be profitable, this study gives further 
support for institutional investors’ active role in corporate governance. 
 
It is possible that institutions with specific characteristics hold large stakes, and this raises 
the concerns of matching issues. These are interesting issues yet not important to this 
study, since the focus is on whether agency problems attract ANY institution to assume 
monitoring role and mitigate problems. Another interesting issue that is not addressed 
here is the existence of multiple large investors and the problem of monitoring provision 
by several large investors. In the current study, monitoring potential is used to explain the 
variation in ownership structure from zero to a positive number of large investors, not to 
explain the variation in terms of different number of large investors. 
 
By documenting evidence that large institutional holding is related to monitoring 
potential, this study adds to the literature on investor activism. It also contributes to the 
literature on the determinants of US ownership structure, showing that monitoring 
potential could be one other important factor. 
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Table 2.1: Variations in Institutional Holding 
 1993 2001 
Mean % Institutional 
Ownership 
46% 60% 
% of firms with ANY 
block institutional investor 
67% 78% 
 
Note: This table shows the over-time change in the prevalence of institutional holding and of large 
institutional holding in the full sample (before excluding missing observations for the variables that are 
used in the regression analysis).  Mean % institutional ownership refers to the average percentage 
ownership by institutional investors, and in the second variable block investor is defined as investor with at 
least 5% ownership stake. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Market Value arket value of equity (in millions) 
Total Assets  book value of assets (in millions) 
Cash Flow Ratio earnings/assets 
Tobin’s Q market value of assets/book value of assets 
Firm Idiosyncratic Risk residual standard deviation from CAPM regression of 
daily stock return on market return 
Leverage Ratio debt/assets 
Anti-takeover defense governance index (Gompers et al 2003) that quantifies 
the number of anti-takeover amendments 
Exist Large Institution dummy variable equals one if there exists ANY 
institutional investor with ownership stake 5% or larger 
Total Institutional Holding percentage of ownership hold by institutional investors 
Concentration of Institutional 
Holding  




Table 2.3: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean S. D. 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 
Market Value 7783.266 25190.25 640.271 1845.189 5470.863 
Total Assets 9637.682 34136.18 683.236 1872.445 6544.75 
Cash Flow Ratio 0.089 0.126 0.051 0.091 0.136 
Tobin’s Q  1.997 1.625 1.158 1.480 2.178 
Firm Idiosyncratic Risk 0.024 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.029 
Leverage Ratio 0.244 0.175 0.112 0.237 0.351 
Anti-takeover defense 9.603 2.709 8 10 12 
Exist Large Institution 0.761 0.427 1 1 1 
Total Institutional 
Holding 
57.807 17.927 46.108 59.349 71.093 
Concentration of 
Institutional Holding 
209.177 297.297 89.643 165.323 263.571 
 
Note: The statistics are based on a sample of firms extracted from Thomson Financial, CompuStat and 
IRRC over the years 1992-2001. The final sample for main regression analysis includes 1381 companies 
and 6737 firm-year total observations. All the financial variables are based on 1992 dollars.   
 
 
Table 2.4: Correlations 
 Exist Large 
Institution 
Risk Log (MV) Anti-
takeover 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.138*    
Log (Market Value) -0.217* -0.330*   
Anti-takeover 0.010  -0.213* 0.059*  
Cash Flow Ratio 0.006 -0.197* 0.181* -0.002 
 
Note: This table presents the coefficients of pair wise correlations among selected variables for the final 




Table 2.5: Determinants for Having a Large Institutional Investor 
 Dep Var =1 if there exists at 
least one block institutional 
investor; 0 o/w 
Idiosyncratic Risk t-1 0.497 
 (0.072)*** 
(Idiosyncratic Risk t-1)2 -0.337 
 (0.074)*** 
Anti-takeover Defense t-1 0.008 
 (0.002)*** 
Log (Market Value) t-1 -0.050 
 (0.004)*** 
Cash flow Ratio t-1 0.561 
 (0.096)*** 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.011 
 (0.005)** 
Tobin’s Q t-1 * Cash flow Ratio t-1 -0.094 
 (0.027)*** 
Leverage Ratio t-1 0.074 
 (0.031)** 
Dividend Ratio t-1 -0.882 
 (0.377)** 
 
Note: This table lists the regression results from estimating the tendency of having any large institutional 
investor (with at least 5% holding), based on the Probit regression as specified in [2.9]. The dependent 
variable is a dummy taking value 1 when there is at least one large institution and 0 otherwise. The reported 
coefficients are the marginal effects of independent variables on the probability. All regressions include 
year effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with *, **, *** indicating significance at 10%, 5%, 




Table 2.6: Change in Institutional Holding over Time 
 
Dep Var =1 if there are more 
block institutional investors 
between t-1 and t; 0 o/w 
Exist Large Institution t-1 -0.112 
 (0.013)*** 
Idiosyncratic Risk t-1 0.358 
 (0.077)*** 
(Idiosyncratic Risk t-1)2 -0.209 
 (0.077)*** 
Anti-takeover Defense t-1 0.004 
 (0.002)** 
Log (Market Value) t-1 -0.018 
 (0.004)*** 
Cash flow Ratio t-1 0.368 
 (0.105)*** 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.006 
 (0.005) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 * Cash flow Ratio t-1 -0.073 
 (0.032)** 
Leverage Ratio t-1 0.082 
 (0.033)** 
Dividend Ratio t-1 -0.126 
 (0.269) 
 
Note: This table examines the change in block institutional shareholding over time. The dependent variable 
is a dummy taking value 1 when the firm is gaining additional large institutions between year t-1 and t, and 
0 otherwise. The reported coefficients are the marginal effects of independent variables on the probability. 
All regressions include year effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with *, **, *** indicating 




Table 2.7: Large Institutional Presence and Investment Behavior 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.029 0.013 0.019 0.010 
 (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** 
Exist Large Institution t-1 -0.005 -0.022 -0.051 -0.037 
 (0.038) (0.012)* (0.042) (0.014)*** 
L t-1 * Tobin’s Q t-1   0.018 0.006 
   (0.006)*** (0.003)* 
Cash flow Ratio t-1 0.016 0.200 0.013 0.192 
 (0.038) (0.068)*** (0.039) (0.068)*** 
Leverage Ratio t-1 -0.555 -0.425 -0.541 -0.422 
 (0.029)*** (0.086)*** (0.027)*** (0.086)*** 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Note: This table reports the regression results based on equation [2.10]. The dependent variable is the 
investment-capital ratio (gross capital expenditure divided by the stock of net property, plant and 
equipment). The regression includes year effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with *, **, *** 
indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2.8: Large Institutional Presence and Acquisition Possibility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.005 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
Exist Large Institution t-1 -0.016 0.008 -0.040 -0.011 
 (0.009)* (0.010) (0.011)*** (0.012) 
L t-1 * Tobin’s Q t-1   0.010 0.008 
   (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Cash flow Ratio t-1 0.091 0.195 0.085 0.181 
 (0.028)*** (0.038)*** (0.028)*** (0.038)*** 
Leverage Ratio t-1 -0.020 -0.332 -0.010 -0.327 
 (0.023) (0.047)*** (0.023) (0.047)*** 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Note: This table reports the regression results from linear regression models of the probability of acquiring 
other firms. The acquisition data is from SDC database. Only completed deals are included. I treat those 
firms in the sample that did not appear in SDC as the ones without acquisition activities in a year. The 
dependent variable equals one if there is acquisition within a year, and zero otherwise. The regression 
includes year effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with *, **, *** indicating significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.9: Large Institutional Presence and Anti-takeover Provisions 
 ∆ Anti-takeover t-1, t ∆ Anti-takeover t-1, t+1 
Exist Large Institution t-1 -0.046 -0.051 
 (0.015)*** (0.024)** 
Anti-takeover Defense t-1 -0.039 -0.080 
 (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
Log (Market Value) t-1 -0.022 -0.047 
 (0.004)*** (0.007)*** 
 
Note: This table shows the effect of large institution on the over-time changes in the number of the anti-
takeover provisions. Lagged firm market value and year effects are also included. Robust standard errors 




Table 2.10: Large Institutional Presence and Takeover Possibility  
 
Dep Var =1 if being 
target; 0 if not 
Exist Large Institution t-1 0.008 
 (0.007) 
Log (Market Value) t-1 -0.001 
 (0.002) 
Stock Return t-1 -0.019 
 (0.007)** 
Anti-takeover Defense t-1 -0.001 
 (0.001) 
 
Note: This table reports the effect of large institution on the actual probability of being acquired. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm receives announcement during the 
year (and the deal is successful later). The reported coefficients are the marginal effects of independent 
variables on the probability. The information on acquisitions is from SDC database. Only completed deals 
are included. We treat those firms in our sample that are not occurring in SDC as the ones without 
acquisition activities in a year. The coefficients are the marginal effects of independent variables on the 
probability of being acquired. Year effects are included. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, with *, 








The Role of Peer Performance in Managerial Compensation Surrounding the 1996 
Telecommunications Act 29 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) receives considerable attention in the accounting, 
finance, and economics literature (e.g., Antle and Smith (1986); Janakiraman et al (1992); 
Gibbons and Murphy (1990); DeFond and Park (1999)). Prior studies identify product 
market competition as a determinant of RPE, but these studies focus on cross-sectional 
variations in competition (e.g., industry concentration), and hence, provide little evidence 
on whether and how firms change RPE as the competitive environment changes 
(e.g.,Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983); Aggarwal and Samwick (1999); DeFond and Park 
(1999); Joh (1999)). We extend the literature by examining the dynamics of RPE 
surrounding the U.S. 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
 
As a milestone in the evolution of the telecommunications industry, the Act undoubtedly 
changed the competition environment of the industry, although the direction of the 
change is still at debate (e.g.,Hazlett (2000); Sidak (2003)). To examine the impact of the 
Act on RPE, we compare the changes in the role of peer performance for 
telecommunications firms against the corresponding changes for size- and performance-
matched benchmark firms from the manufacturing sector. Our final sample consists of 45 
pairs of telecommunications firms and their benchmarks, both identified from the 
EXECUCOMP dataset over 1992-2001. The results indicate that the association between 
                                                 
29 This chapter is based on a joint work with Shijun Cheng, now published in the Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy 2006. 
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peer stock performance and executive compensation is insignificant before the Act and 
negatively significant after the Act. These changes in the role of peer performance are 
significant standing alone, or relative to the benchmark manufacturing firms. The weight 
on peer accounting performance also declined significantly post-Act, but the change is 
statistically insignificant relative to the corresponding changes of the benchmark firms. 
Overall, these results show that RPE became more valuable for telecommunications firms 
in the post-Act period. 
3.2 Background and Hypothesis 
3.2.1 The 1996 Telecommunications Act  
Historically the U.S. communication policy evolved to keep communication services 
separated, but technology developments in the mid 1990s facilitated convergence in 
different modes of communications and made regulatory separation between content and 
conduit increasingly difficult. The 1996 Telecommunications Act signed by President 
Clinton on February 8, 1996, aims at an opening of market to competitors and a reduction 
of market power through facilitating communication companies to enter each other’s 
market, especially in the monopolized local exchange markets. Under the Act, local 
telephone companies, long-distance carriers and cable television operators can enter each 
other’s markets. Local exchange carriers can offer video programming services 
themselves or carry other video programming services. The Act also allows the seven 
regional Bell operating companies to offer long-distance telephone service for the first 
time since the 1984 breakup of AT&T, under the condition that there is “sufficient 
competition” in the local markets. At the same time, long distance companies and cable 
operators are allowed to provide local exchange service in direct competition with the 
regional Bell operating companies. The Act thus fosters cross-penetration in the 
telecommunications industry.  Proponents of the Act expected such cross-penetration to 
increase competition in the industry, whereas others argue that the Act is an abysmal 
failure due to unintended responses from the telecommunications companies, such as 




3.2.2 The Hypothesis 
As suggested by Holmstrom (1982), shareholders may use peer performance as a 
benchmark to filter out effects of common market or industry shocks, and therefore be 
able to evaluate managerial performance more accurately. As such, RPE predicts a 
negative association between peer performance and managerial compensation, and a 
positive association between own performance and managerial compensation. While 
enhancing risk-sharing between shareholders and managers, RPE also has incentive 
effects. For example, RPE may provide managers with incentives to compete against peer 
firms because their compensation decreases with peer performance (Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999); Joh (1999)), making it harder for the group being evaluated to enforce a 
collusive agreement. On the other hand, RPE may also provide an incentive to collude by 
either making sure no one sticks out too far, or letting there be a big winner and splitting 
the gains, perhaps by taking turns in being the big winner. 
 
As the competition environment of the telecommunications industry changes after the 
Act, it is very likely that when determining RPE, shareholders change the relative weight 
placed on their considerations of risk-sharing and encouraging/discouraging collusive 
behavior in the product market. However, absent a theory predicting such relative weight, 
as well as a consensus regarding the impact of the Act on the competition level of the 
industry, ex ante, we do not have a clear prediction for how RPE changes after the Act. 
We therefore state the hypothesis in null form: 
Hypothesis: The association between peer performance and managerial 
compensation remains the same in the post-Act period as in the pre-Act period. 
3.3 Sample and Data 
3.3.1 Sample and Data 
We start our sample selection with the 68 firms in the telecommunications industry (SIC 
code 48) covered by the EXECUCOMP dataset over the period 1992-2001. This sample 
period not only witnessed the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996, but also includes 
several years before and after the passage of the Act, and thus, is suitable for studying the 
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impact of the Act. To control for secular trends and other confounding factors, for each 
telecommunications company we identify a benchmark firm from the manufacturing 
industry (Standard Industrial Classification codes 20-39). We select benchmark firms 
based on data of 1995, the year before the Act. 46 of the telecommunications firms have 
data on both firm size (book value of assets) and performance (return on common 
equity).  For each of these 46 telecommunication firms, we select a manufacturing firm 
whose book value of asset is between 70% and 130% of the book value of assets of the 
telecommunications firm and also with closest magnitude of return on equity.30 One of 
the 46 matched pairs do not have other data required for our main regressions discussed 
in Section 4, and our final sample consists of 45 telecommunications firms and 45 
benchmark firms. Our data on executive compensation and ownership are from the 
EXECUCOMP.  Data on stock and financial items are from CRSP and COMPUSATA 
respectively. 
3.3.2 Measurement 
Following prior studies (e.g.,Aggarwal and Samwick (1999); Garvey and Milbourn 
(2004); Hartzell and Starks (2003); Joh (1999)), we focus on executive annual total pay. 
Specifically, executive cash pay (C_PAY) is the sum of the executive’s salary and annual 
bonus. Executive total pay (T_PAY) is the sum of the executive’s cash pay, cash payouts 
from long-term incentive plans, value of stock and option grants (based on the Black and 
Scholes (1973) model adjusted for dividends), and all other annual pay. Following 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), among others, we consider top executives as a team and 
include all executives with valid compensation data from the EXECUCOMP dataset in 
our analyses, but allow CEOs to have different compensation levels and sensitivities to 
own and peer performance. 
 
We use both accounting and stock performance measures as compensation determinants 
(Murphy (1999)). We measure accounting performance as accounting return on common 
equity (ROE), defined as income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item #18) 
                                                 
30 The matching method is a common technique and is used in Barber and Lyon (1996), Kole and Lehn 
(1999), and Parrino et al (2003). 
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divided by the average book value of common equity (COMPUSTAT item # 60). Our 
stock performance measure is the firm’s annual stock returns (RET). For each firm, we 
define its peer group as all other firms in the same four-digit SIC code industry. 
Accordingly, following Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) 
we measure peer stock (accounting) performance as the value-weighted average of RET 























/ ),  
where j indexes firms and t indexes fiscal years, and V is the market value of equity (book 
value of common equity), and we denote peer stock (accounting) performance by 
Ind_RET (Ind_ROE). 
 
We include a number of variables to control for factors that prior studies identify as 
having effects on executive compensation (Murphy (1999)). We use ASSET, book value 
of assets (COMPUSTAT item #6), to control for firm size. We use market-to-book value 
of assets (MTB) to control for growth opportunities of the firm, where MTB is calculated 
as market value of equity (COMPUSTAT item #25 ×item #199) plus book value of 
liabilities (COMPUSTAT item #6 – item #60), divided by ASSET. We include annualized 
stock volatility (VOLAT), measured as standard deviation of stock returns over the past 
60 months, to control for firm risk. We use financial leverage (LEV), defined as total debt 
(COMPUSTAT item #9 + item #34) divided by ASSET, to control for capital structure. 
3.3.3 Analyses and Results 
Table 0.2 presents summary statistics of the 45 telecommunications versus 45 benchmark 
firms based on data of 1995. The results largely suggest that in the year before the 
passage of the Act, the telecommunications firms and their benchmarks are not different 
from each other along most important dimensions. 
 
Following prior studies, we regress managerial compensation on own firm performance 
and peer performance, controlling for other factors (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy (1990); 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999); Joh (1999)). We use a difference-in-differences design 
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and compare the changes in the role of peer performance in executive pay for 
telecommunications firms against the corresponding changes for the size- and 
performance-matched benchmark firms. This design helps mitigate the effects of factors 
other than the Act affecting the role of peer performance in all firms. We specify the 
model below. 
[0.1] 
COMPi,j,t = β0 + β1RET j,t + β2Ind_RET j,t + β3Dt × RET j,t + β4Dt × Ind_RET j,t  
+ β5T j × RET j,t + β6T j × Ind_RET j,t + β7Dt × Tj × RET j,t + β8Dt × T j × Ind_RET j,t  
+ β9ROE j,t + β10Ind_ROE j,t + β11Dt × ROE j,t + β12Dt × Ind_ROE j,t  
+ β13T j × ROE j,t + β14T j × Ind_ROE j,t + β15Dt × Tj × ROE j,t + β16Dt × T j × Ind_ROE j,t 
+β17CEOi,j,t + β18CEOi,j,t × RET j,t + β19CEOi,j,t × Ind_RET j,t 
  + β20CEOi,j,t × ROE j,t + β21CEOi,j,t × Ind_ROE j,t + CONTROLS + Error Termi,j,t.         
 
Similar to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), executive i works at firm j in year t. COMPi,j,t 
is the compensation of executive i at firm j in year t, defined as the natural log of C_PAY 
or T_PAY. T j is equal to 1 if the firm is a telecommunications firm and 0 otherwise, and 
Dt is an indicator equal to 1 for the post-Act period (1997-2001), and 0 for the pre-Act 
period (1992-1995).31 CEOi,j,t is an indicator equal to 1 if executive i is the CEO of firm j 
in year t, and 0 otherwise. CONTROLS denotes the set of control variables, including 
ASSET, MTB, VOLAT, LEV, and firm and year indicators. Because the model controls for 
firm fixed effects, it is effectively similar to changes models in prior studies (e.g., 
Gibbons and Murphy (1990)). The model also accounts for the possibility that CEOs 
have different pay levels and pay-performance sensitivities. 
 
The coefficient on Dt × T j × Ind_RET j,t (β8) captures the change in the role of peer stock 
performance for telecommunications firms, relative to the benchmark firms. Similarly, 
the coefficient on the coefficient on Dt × T j × Ind_ROE j,t (β16) captures the change in the 
role of peer accounting performance for telecommunications firms, relative to the 
benchmark firms. To illustrate, the combined coefficient on peer performance Ind_RET j,t 
for the benchmark firms is β2 pre-Act and  β2 + β4 post-Act, and the change following the 
                                                 
31 Our results remain unchanged if we extend Dt by defining Dt as 1 or 0 for 1996. 
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Act is β4. For the telecommunications firms, the combined coefficient on peer 
performance Ind_RET j,t is β2 + β6  pre-Act and β2 + β6 + β4 + β8 post-Act, with β4 + β8 as 
the change in the combined coefficient on Ind_RET j,t following the Act. Thus, relative to 
the benchmark firms the change in the combined coefficient on Ind_RET j,t for 
telecommunications firms following the Act is β8. 
 
Table 0.3 reports the estimates of Equation [0.1] and Table 0.4 summarizes the results to 
facilitate the interpretations of the results. While the results for executive cash pay and 
total pay are basically similar, our interpretation is based on the results for executive total 
pay, because it is a better proxy for executive compensation. The results in Table 0.3 
indicate that the coefficient on Dt × T j × Ind_RET j,t (β8) is negatively significant for 
executive total pay (-0.87, p < 0.01). Table 0.4 demonstrates this coefficient as post- 
versus pre-Act change in the weight on Ind_RET for telecommunications firms minus the 
corresponding change for the benchmark firms. In fact, for the telecommunications firms 
the weight on Ind_RET in executive total pay is negative but insignificant pre-Act (-
0.175), and negatively significant post-Act (-0.753, p < 0.01), with a significant change 
of -0.578 (p < 0.01). The corresponding change for the benchmark firms is 0.295 
(insignificant). Thus, the difference between the changes for the telecommunications and 
benchmark firms is -0.753 - 0.295 = -0.873 (p < 0.01), which is the coefficient on Dt × T j 
× Ind_RET j,t (β8) shown in Table 0.3. The results imply that holding others constant, if 
peer performance (Ind_RET) increases by one standard deviation of 0.58, executive total 
pay (T_PAY) will decrease by 0.175 × 0.58 = 10% pre-Act, and by 0.753 × 0.58 = 44% 
post-Act. 
 
In short, Table 0.4 shows that for executive total pay the weight on peer stock 
performance is insignificant pre-Act and negatively significant post-Act for the 
telecommunications firms, and this change is negatively significant relative to the 
corresponding change for the benchmark firms. The change in the weight on peer 
accounting performance is also negatively significant for the telecommunications firms, 
but relative to the benchmark firms, it is insignificant. Together, these results show that 
the telecommunications firms (relative to the benchmark firms) significantly reduced the 
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weight on peer performance in compensating executives. In other words, RPE became 
more valuable after the Act.32 
 
There are alternative interpretations of the findings. One interpretation is that in the spirit 
of Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), the Act changed competition in such a way that peer 
performance is more informative about managerial performance post-Act. Another 
interpretation is that after the Act, shareholders strengthened RPE in managerial 
compensation to discourage collusion with competitors in the product market (Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999); Joh (1999)). However, this interpretation is subject to the following 
possibility discussed earlier: managers may have incentives to cooperate so that no one 
will stick out too far. In this exploratory study, we do not distinguish between these 
alternative interpretations.33 
 
Nevertheless, our findings are not inconsistent with the criticisms that the Act only led to 
modest improvement in competitiveness or even turned out to be an abysmal failure due 
to unintended responses from the telecommunications companies (Hazlett (2000); Sidak 
(2003)). One widely recognized example of such response is the horizontal mega-mergers 
in the post-Act period aimed at reducing competition pressure created by the Act (e.g., 
Warf (2003)). The motivations of these mergers are not necessarily anti-competitive, and 
in fact, our results from unreported additional analyses show that horizontal mergers 
actually hurt peer performance. 
 
Furthermore, our main results reported in Table 0.3 and Table 0.4 are robust to a number 
of sensitivity checks. Our results are very similar when we include CEOs only in our 
analyses, or when we calculate peer performance based on two-digit or three-digit SIC 
code industries. The results are also insensitive to our choice of benchmark firms; the 
                                                 
32 In additional analyses, the results indicate that the role of peer performance in indirect compensation 
executives derive from changes in the value of their existing equity portfolio, another important component 
of executive incentives, did not change significantly post-Act. This sensitivity check mitigates the concern 
that our results are driven by changes in the role of peer performance in executive equity holdings. 
33 Compensation contracts can possibly affect competition strategies, but they are not the only factor with 
such an effect. There could be other agreements between the firms or between shareholders and managers 
that are unobservable to us. Therefore we need to be cautious to infer the firms’ competition strategies from 
the compensation contracts examined. 
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results remain unchanged when we use all the firms from the manufacturing sector or 
when we use all non-telecommunications firms covered in the EXECUCOMP dataset 
over 1992-2001. We also use stock performance only or accounting performance only 
when estimating our empirical model, and for each performance measure we find results 
similar to those reported in Table 0.3. Finally, the results do not change when we use 
executive pay levels as our dependent variables, whether we use all observations, 
eliminate outliers, or use median regressions (which are less sensitive to outliers). 
3.4 Conclusion 
We use the introduction of the U.S. 1996 Telecommunications Act as our empirical 
setting to examine the dynamics of the role of peer performance in managerial 
compensation. The results from 45 pairs of telecommunications and size- and 
performance-matched benchmark firms indicate that the weight on peer performance 
declined post-Act, suggesting that RPE became more valuable for the telecommunication 
firms following the Act. Besides shedding some light on the impact of the Act, our results 
show how managerial incentives in general, and the role of peer performance in 
particular, changed with the firm’s competition environment. Our empirical setting is 
relatively exogenous, and hence, helps mitigate concerns with omitted variables and 
endogeneity. Our focus on managerial incentives complements prior studies about the 
telecommunication sector reforms examining factors such as product prices and industry 
concentration (e.g., Parker and Roller (1997); Warf (2003)), because these factors and 
managerial incentives are likely to interact with each other. 
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Table 0.1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
C_PAY  Executive cash pay (in thousands), including salary and annual bonuses 
T_PAY  Executive total annual pay (in thousands), including cash pay, value of 
equity grants during the year, fringe benefits, and cash payouts from other 
long-term incentive plans 
RET  annual stock return 
Ind_RET  value-weighted average of annual stock returns of all other firms in the same 
four-digit SIC code industry 
ROE  income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item #18) divided by 
average book value of common equity (COMPUSATA item #60) 
Ind_ROE  value-weighted average of ROE of all other firms in the same four-digit SIC 
code industry 
ASSET  book value of assets (in millions, COMPUSTAT item #6) 
MTB  market to book value of assets, defined as COMPUSTAT [(item #25 × item 
199) + (item #6 – item #60)]/ item #6 
VOLAT  annualized stock volatility, measured as the standard deviation of stock 
returns over 60 months 
LEV  total debts divided by total assets, defined as COMPUSTAT (item #9 + item 
#34)/ item #6 
 
 
Table 0.2: Summary Statistics of the Telecommunications versus Benchmark Firms 
 Mean of 
Telecommunications 







C_PAY  1,130.75 973.08 0.21 
T_PAY  2,507.31 2,541.44 0.93 
RET  0.52 0.32 0.10 
Ind_RET  0.30 0.27 0.89 
ROE  0.07 0.10 0.47 
Ind_ROE  0.08 0.10 0.89 
ASSET  11,356.66 8,307.59 0.34 
MTB  2.07 1.94 0.58 
VOLAT  0.28 0.32 0.30 
LEV  0.66 0.57 0.04 
 
Note: The statistics presented in this table are based on a sample of 45 telecommunications firms (with two-
digit SIC code 48) and 45 size- and performance- matched (matched using data in 1995) manufacturing 
firms (with two-digit SIC codes 20-39) identified from the EXECUCOMP dataset over 1992-2001 





Table 0.3: Regressions of Executive Annual Pay on Own and Peer Performance 
Dependent Variable Ln(C_PAYi,j,t) Ln(T_PAYi,j,t) 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
RETj,t  0.692 0.395 
 (0.000)*** (0.025)** 
Ind_RETj,t -0.765 -0.298 
 (0.000)*** (0.128) 
Dt × RET j,t  -0.651 -0.248 
 (0.000)*** (0.161) 
Dt × Ind_RETj,t 0.880 0.295 
 (0.000)*** (0.188) 
Tj × RET j,t  -0.556 -0.089 
 (0.000)*** (0.652) 
Tj × Ind_RETj,t 0.733 0.123 
 (0.000)*** (0.550) 
Dt × Tj × RET j,t  0.596 0.174 
 (0.000)*** (0.327) 
Dt × Tj × Ind_RETj,t -0.932 -0.873 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
ROEj,t  1.421 1.036 
 (0.019)** (0.010)** 
Ind_ROEj,t -0.952 -1.347 
 (0.109) (0.021)** 
Dt × ROE j,t  -1.239 -0.933 
 (0.049)** (0.187) 
Dt × Ind_ROEj,t 1.024 1.079 
 (0.111) (0.234) 
Tj × ROE j,t  -1.184 -1.803 
 (0.063)* (0.000)*** 
Tj × Ind_ROEj,t 0.085 2.386 
 (0.888) (0.007)*** 
Dt × Tj × ROE j,t  1.047 1.971 
 (0.102) (0.005)*** 
Dt × Tj × Ind_ROEj,t -0.739 -1.912 
 (0.304) (0.115) 
Control Variable   
CEO I,j,t 0.744 0.857 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
CEO I,j,t × RET j,t 0.014 -0.079 
 (0.558) (0.128) 
CEO I,j,t × Ind_RET j,t -0.049 0.078 
 (0.220) (0.215) 
CEO I,j,t × ROE j,t 0.176 0.139 
 (0.005)*** (0.200) 
CEO I,j,t × Ind_ROE j,t 0.024 -0.046 
 (0.912) (0.862) 
Ln(ASSET) j,t-1 0.178 0.303 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
MTBj,t-1  0.065 0.117 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
VOLAT j,t-1  -0.236 -0.456 
 (0.323) (0.097)* 
LEV j,t-1 -0.506 -0.871 
 (0.119) (0.007)*** 
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D t × T j 0.234 0.564 
 (0.009)*** (0.001)*** 
CONSTANT 4.931 4.478 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Sample Size 1687 1687 
Adjusted R2 0.758 0.750 
 
Note: This table presents the regression results of executive annual pay on own and peer performance 
surrounding the 1996 Telecommunications Act, using manufacturing firms as benchmarks. The regression 
is based on equation [0.1], where i indexes for executive, j for firm and t for year. P-values (in parentheses) 
are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlations with *, **, *** 




Table 0.4: Comparing Combined Coefficients on Own and Peer Performance 








































































































































































Note: The combined coefficients are based on the results in Table 0.3. P-values (in parentheses) are based 
on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlations with *, **, *** indicating 





The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from the Tobacco Settlement Payment to States 34 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Late 1990s witnessed the great success in the U.S. public health history of attacking 
enormous problems posed by tobacco use. On November 23, 1998, 46 states and other 
U.S. territories signed the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the five largest U.S. 
tobacco manufacturers, joining four states (Mississippi, Texas, Florida and Minnesota) 
that had reached earlier, individual settlements. This multi-state settlement ended four 
years of litigation against the tobacco industry by the states seeking for recovery of 
medical costs incurred in the past when treating smoking-related diseases. The settlement 
commits tobacco manufacturers to make annual payments to the states in perpetuity, with 
total payments over the first 25 years estimated at several hundred billion dollars. The 
scope of the settlement and the magnitude of the payments involved provide a natural 
experiment to study the flypaper effect. 
 
The flypaper effect is an empirical puzzle at odds with the theoretical prediction 
regarding the response of public spending to intergovernmental grants or windfalls. A 
simple median-voter model in which the private income and grants or windfalls are 
assumed to be fully fungible predicts that government’s proclivity to spend on public 
goods should not depend on the source of income. In other words, marginal propensity of 
public spending out of the private income should be equal to that out of fiscal grants or 
                                                 
34 This chapter is based on a joint work with Xin Li. 
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windfalls. Nevertheless, numerous empirical studies have generally found that fiscal 
grants or windfall money boosts government spending more than an equivalent increase 
in private income. The puzzle is referred as the flypaper effect since money “sticks where 
it hits” (Gramlich et al (1973)). 
 
Fisher (1982) provides an excellent survey on the earlier literature. Wyckoff (1991) and 
Hines, James R. Jr. and Thaler (1995) review more recent studies. Table 0.1 presents the 
summary results from commonly cited studies since the 1990s. In these studies, higher 
marginal propensity to spend from grants than from private income is found as evidence 
for the flypaper effect. The estimated income effect from private source is in the ballpark 
of 0.01-0.05. The estimated effect of grants income on public spending varies from 0.25 
(Gramlich et al (1973)) to 1.70 (Grossman (1990)) while the majority of the recent 
findings narrowed it down to the range of from 0.6 to 1. 
 
Explanations on the puzzle generally fall into two categories, estimation bias or voter 
misperception. The common type of estimation bias relates to endogeneity of some 
explanatory variables. One typical example is the so-called “price effect” associated with 
matching grants. Lower level jurisdictions usually need to commit their own income 
resource to support their government spending in order to obtain subsidies from a higher 
level jurisdiction at certain rates, which creates a spurious positive correlation between 
public spending and grants. Failure to control for this price effect can result in 
overestimation of the fiscal responsiveness to grant receipts. In addition, policy 
endogeneity is introduced from political economy literature and generalized by Besley 
and Case (2000).35 They argue that empirical methodologies that exploit policy changes 
cross jurisdiction and over time to study the effect of policies on economic outcomes may 
be problematic since policies are themselves determined through bargaining processes by 
political representatives whose actions may reflect underlying constituent preferences. 
                                                 
35 Earlier studies on policy endogeneity include Schneider and Moon Ji (1990) and Ahmad (1997). The 
former provides theoretical grounds for endogenous grants by analyzing factors that affect local 
government’s decision to seek intergovernmental aid. The latter investigates grant schemes in OECD and 
developing countries and finds that lower-level governments have incentives to pursue policies that 
increase the probability of obtaining cheap resources from central authorities. 
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Hence, failure to identify and control for the forces that lead policies to change biases the 
estimates of a policy’s incidence. Knight (2002) applies this idea to investigate the fiscal 
outcome of federal highway grants. As in Besley and Case (2000), he illustrates that both 
federal grants and state spending are determined through a political process which 
constituent preferences underlie. He develops a legislative bargaining model to 
incorporate the positive correlation between grant receipts and the unobserved 
preferences for state spending and uses the political power of state congressional 
delegations as the instrument variable for the endogenous grant. After controlling for the 
policy endogeneity, the flypaper puzzle is eliminated. 
 
The second type of estimation bias is due to the omitted variable. Case et al (1993) 
formalize the situation in which states tailor their fiscal practice after behaviors of 
similarly situated states. They find that the omitted fiscal spillover effect leads to a 
substantial upward bias in the estimated responsiveness of state spending to federal 
grants, although the corrected marginal propensity to spend out of grant money still 
significantly exceeds the estimated effect of private income. The third type of estimation 
bias is caused by improperly used econometric model. Moffitt (1984) demonstrates that 
the seemingly persistent flypaper effect is associated with some incorrectly used OLS 
specification. He formally models the non-linear budget constraint in the presence of 
AFDC grant and finds that the puzzle is resolved. 
 
The other branch of explanation features voter misperception. It is possible that voters 
confuse the average and marginal price effect of unconditional grants and this confusion 
leads to overspending on public goods and services (Courant et al (1979); Oates (1979)). 
Alternatively, Filimon et al (1982) tell a story that voters suffer from imperfect 
information and underestimate the amount of grant. The lack of information by voters 
makes it possible for budget-maximizing officials to set expenditures beyond the socially 
preferred level. More recent study by Strumpf (1998) considers the fiscal response of 
suburban Philadelphia communities to various public windfalls including the “earned 
income tax” windfall from in-commuting non-residents. He provides further evidence 
that imperfect voter information plays an essential role in explaining the flypaper effect. 
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The administrative overhead index that he proposes as a gauge of voter control over fiscal 
decisions helps explain heterogeneous spending elasticities out of various public 
windfalls. 
 
While the vast body of the literature focuses on intergovernmental grants, there are a few 
exceptions. In addition to Strumpf (1998), researchers have been trying to utilize 
exogenous windfalls other than policy changes as the source of variation in non-private 
income, which helps avoid the price bias and the policy endogeneity problem as 
discussed above. Olmsted et al (1993) analyze the impact of bond issue retirement on 
school spending in Missouri. The retirement of bond issue reduces debt service rates and 
has an effect on spending similar to that from a lump-sum aid. They find that a dollar 
increase in lump-sum state aid increases per-pupil spending by 58 cents whereas 
additional dollar in median income leads to 5 cents increase in per-pupil spending. Ladd 
(1993) uses the federal tax base expansion due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as a 
natural experiment and finds that an additional dollar of TRA86 windfalls had led to an 
average increase of 40 cents in state spending. 
 
In this paper, we exploit the tobacco settlement between the U.S. states and major 
tobacco manufacturers in the late 1990s as another natural experiment to further 
investigate the flypaper puzzle. Our analysis possesses a few advantages in comparison to 
most of the existing research. Most importantly, it is immune from the potential price 
effect since the payment is purely a lump sum transfer from tobacco manufacturers to 
states. It is also least subject to voter incomplete information because the payment 
amount and adjustment factors are widely publicized. Moreover, the settlement funds 
each state has received or will be receiving are predetermined based on a set of fixed 
allocation percentages agreed by state attorneys general. The fact that policy changes 
cross jurisdictions plays little role here prevents our estimates from the policy 
endogeneity problem.36 Last but not least, the influx of tobacco funds that is favorable to 
                                                 
36 Other endogeneity concerns may exist, however. For example, the settlement allocation shares were 
determined partially based on the historical level of Medicaid spending that is trending over time. In 
addition, states bargained over the allocation percentages before reaching the consensus. We shall return to 
these issues when discussing the empirical strategy below. 
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both voters and state government agencies is not earmarked for any specific usage.37 
Each state has total discretion on where to spend the money. It thus serves as a clean 
natural experiment to study the change in public good provision at the state level in 
response to a windfall. Using the fixed-trend approach to resolve some potential 
endogeneity issues, we find that state direct expenditure increases by about $1 in 
response to one dollar increase in settlement revenue, while it does so only by about 55 
cents to federal grants and 8 cents to private income. The evidence supports a strong 
flypaper effect associated with the settlement windfall. 
 
We also look into how voter preference contributes to heterogeneous spending behaviors 
among states. 38  State smoking prevalence and the engagement of state economy in 
tobacco manufacturing are two factors that we conjecture can considerably influence 
voter preferences on how to spend the windfall money. Our finding shows that states with 
a higher percentage of adult smoking population or major tobacco-manufacturing exhibit 
lower spending propensity from the tobacco revenue. 
  
A closely related study to ours is Singhal (2008) who proposes and tests a different 
explanation for the non-fungibility of government spending from discretionary grants. 
She examines the influence on grant distribution of special interest groups with the ability 
to raise funds for local governments. Using tobacco settlement windfall data, she tests the 
fungibility of windfall revenues for state tobacco-control spending. The results suggest 
that the marginal propensity to spend on the state tobacco-control spending is $0.2 per 
dollar of settlement revenue, and states that did not file law suits spend significantly less 
post-settlement. She concludes that the observed spending pattern is consistent with the 
prediction from the interest group model proposed in her study. 
                                                 
37 Voters may perceive differently the net benefit from the settlement depending on the extent to which they 
are affected by the payment financially. For instance, smokers and tobacco growers will eventually bear the 
financial burden of the payment via forward and backward cost transfers, respectively. This impact on voter 
self-interest may affect the marginal proclivity of state spending out of the tobacco windfalls. We shall 
return to this issue when studying heterogeneous responses. 
38 Existing research has generally examined two types of heterogeneous fiscal responses. One involves 
asymmetric responses to the rise and fall in grants or windfall (Ladd (1993); Stine (1994); Levaggi and 
Zanola (2003)). Another relates to different sizes of spending responses to variation in external incomes of 




Our study also uses the tobacco settlement data to study government spending responses, 
however, our primary goal is to test for the existence of flypaper effect utilizing tobacco 
settlement’s unique feature that it is not subject to common critiques against most 
flypaper studies. We document flypaper effect on a much larger scale in the overall state 
spending, while the non-fungibility of settlement revenues found in Singhal’s study only 
applies to the specific category of tobacco prevention spending, which represents only a 
very small portion of the total windfall receipts39. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the tobacco settlement payments. In Section 3, we lay out the empirical 
strategy, comment on potential endogeneity issues, and discuss the data variations in the 
tobacco payment. The results and implications are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
4.2 Tobacco Settlement Agreements 
Led by state Attorney General Michael Moore, Mississippi sued the tobacco industry on 
behalf of taxpayers seeking for compensation for state tax money spent on smoking-
related illnesses in 1994. The lawsuit, the first of its kind, led to a settlement for nearly 
$3.6 billion on July 3, 1997.40 Florida, Texas and Minnesota followed and had their 
lawsuits individually settled for $11.3 billion, $15.3 billion and $6.1 billion in August 
1997, January and May 1998, respectively. The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), a 
comprehensive settlement signed in November 1998, involved the rest of the 46 states, 
the District of Columbia and other U.S. territories. According to the MSA, tobacco 
manufacturers were committed to pay approximately $206 billion over the following 25 
years to states as reimbursement for past Medicaid expenditures states incurred treating 
                                                 
39 For example, spending on tobacco prevention and control represented only 5% of the total settlement 
revenue in fiscal year 2000-2001, according to Health policy Tracking Service, National Conference of 
State Legislatures, August 2002. 




smoking related illnesses. The settlement agreements also imposed limited restrictions on 
the marketing of tobacco products. 
 
There are different types of payments for the states that signed either individual 
agreements or the master agreement. The largest two payments are the up-front payments 
and the annual payments. We take the payments made to the 46 MSA states for 
illustration purposes. According to the master agreement, up-front payments are made in 
five installments of $2.4 billion annually between 1998 and 2003 adjusted for a 3 percent 
inflation factor.41 Annual payments beginning with a $4.5 billion payment on April 15, 
2000 will continue in perpetuity.42 Both of these types of payments are distributed based 
on fixed allocation percentages agreed to by state attorneys general. The information on 
allocation percentages is presented in Table 0.2.  
 
The allocation shares were resulted from negotiations that began with a complex formula. 
The formula was composed of a series of factors including smoking-related Medicaid 
expenditures, population, population densities and smoking prevalence.43 We will return 
for more discussions about this formula. A third type of payment, known as the Strategic 
Contribution Fund payment, will begin in 2008 and continue through 2017. These are 
intended to reflect the level of the contribution each state made toward final resolution of 
the lawsuits. In addition, tobacco growers and producers in states that grow cigarette 
tobacco also receive Phase II payment through a separate agreement from 1999 through 
2010 that is intended to provide compensation for financial losses due to the anticipated 
decline in cigarette consumption. 
 
The payments actually received by each state potentially differ from the originally 
estimated amount due to various adjustments, most important of which are inflation 
adjustment, volume adjustment and non-participating manufacturers adjustment. The 
                                                 
41 The initial payments are as follows: $2.400 billion in 1998, $2.472 billion in 2000, $2.546 billion in 
2001, $2.623 billion in 2002 and $2.700 billion in 2003. There was no up-front payment in 1999. 
42 The annual payment schedule is as follows: $4.5 billion in 2000, $5 billion in 2001, $6.5 in each of 2002 
and 2003, $8 billion in each year 2004-2007, $8.139 billion annually in 2008-2017 and $9 billion in 2018 
and thereafter. 
43 General Accounting Office report, “States Use of Master Settlement Agreement Payments”, June 2000. 
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inflation adjustment equals the actual inflation rate for the preceding year or three 
percent, whichever is greater. The volume adjustment applies to reflect the fluctuation in 
tobacco manufacturers’ operating income from the cigarette sales within each state. It’s 
estimated that cigarette consumption has declined by about 6.5% in 1999 alone mostly 
due to one-time increases in cigarette prices after the master agreement took effect. And 
it is predicted that the decline in cigarette consumption will continue by nearly two 
percent annually, which will result in lower tobacco payments than originally expected. 
The non-participating manufacturer adjustment is to address market share losses 
attributable to the provisions in the agreement. If the aggregate market share of the 
companies that participate in the agreement declines by greater than two percent, their 
annual payment is reduced by three percent for each percent lost over the two percent 
threshold. Thus, the actual amount that states have received or will receive fluctuates 
over time due to these adjustment factors even though their shares of the payment stay 
fixed. 
 
One of the crucial features of the settlement funds is that they are not earmarked and the 
settlement agreements do not dictate how states should spend the money. Because of 
complicated legal requirements states had to fulfill, funds from the master settlement 
were not available to the 46 states until January 2000 when their economies were at their 
strongest. Since then, the MSA states have received about 22 billions from fiscal year 
2000 to 2002. California and New York had received the largest amount, nearly $2.7 
billion each. California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania together 
received about 50 percent of the master agreement payment. During the same period, 
Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi and Texas that had started to receive their individual 
payments in earlier years received over $7 billion. On average, the settlement fund 
received by each state amounted to 1.3% of annual state direct spending or $34 per capita 
from fiscal year 2000 to 2002. 
 
The unprecedented large amount of the settlement payments created an opportunity for 
states to establish new programs and expand existing programs in a variety of policy 
areas. Because claims for compensation for the past smoking-related Medicaid costs were 
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the basis for the tobacco lawsuits filed by the states, high priority has been given to health 
related funding and tobacco control programs.44 Based upon the statistics provided by the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, a bit less than $7 billion or 30 percent of the 
total payment had been dedicated for health related purposes among the 46 states that 
signed the master agreement from fiscal year 2000 to 2002. These allocations included 
funding for Medicaid, State Children’s Health Insurance Program, tobacco use prevention 
and etc. About $2 billion or nine percent of the tobacco revenue was placed in education 
and children and youth programs while five percent was allocated to tobacco control 
efforts. 45 In addition, three percent of the MSA fund was assigned for assistance to 
tobacco growers and economic development projects. Rainy day funds and endowments 
were also established to fund program activities with interest earned. The vast majority of 
these endowments will provide funds for health care services. A few states, for example, 
Connecticut and Illinois, used the payment explicitly to fund tax reduction. Specifically, 
Connecticut used a total of 38 percent, or $50 million per year, of its tobacco payment for 
property tax reductions. Illinois used 50 percent, $316 million, for an earned income tax 
credit and a one-time property tax reduction. The figures represent states’ reported 
spending from settlement revenue, and do not take into account potential crowd out from 
other parts of the state budget. 
 
4.3 Empirical Strategies 
To test for the existence of the flypaper effect associated with the settlement revenue, we 
estimate state marginal propensities to spend from voter private income and settlement 
windfalls, respectively. As in most studies, we make use of the state budget constraint 
                                                 
44 In June 1997, the AG of Indiana sent a memo to all suing Attorneys General which made clear that 
Medicaid recoveries were central to the state lawsuits. The memo explains that “states are in business of 
administering Medicaid, and Medicaid reimbursement was the primary element of damages for most, if not 
all, suing States.” In a footnote, the memo elaborates: “We realize, of course, that most States also sued on 
other theories such as antitrust, RICO, and consumer protection. States have in common, however, the 
desire for Medicaid reimbursement.” Source: Attorney General Jeff Modisett, Memorandum to All Suing 
Attorneys General, June 23, 1997, p.3. 
45 Education includes funding for kindergarten through grade 12 education and tuition for and scholarships 
to community colleges, colleges and universities. Children and youth program includes funding for early 
childhood programs, after-school adolescent programs and juvenile justice programs. 
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and allow the slope coefficients of different types of income to vary. The analysis is 
based on state government financial data from Government Finances, Census Bureau, as 
well as settlement revenue allocation information. The sample contains annual 
observations of 50 states for fiscal years 1992-2002. 46  Summary statistics for the 
variables used in the study are presented in Table 0.3. 
 
We use a fixed-trend model as specified in equation [0.1]. 
[0.1] itititititiit AidSettleIncometSpend εβββαλα ++++⋅++= 321   
The dependent variable is state direct expenditure that is defined as the general 
expenditure exclusive of intergovernmental transfer payments, utility, liquor store and 
insurance trust expenditures. The key independent variables are income variables from 
various sources. Incomeit is personal disposable income, Settleit state settlement receipts 
and Aidit federal grants that are used to control for other income resources available for 
state governments. All dollar amounts are in per capita real terms deflated using year 
1992 CPI. The symbol i indicates state and t year. The variables αi and λt are state and 
year dummies, respectively. The variable t is the time trend.  States are allowed to have 
different spending trend over time, which is captured by ti ⋅α . 
 
The β’s measure the marginal propensities of state public spending out of private income, 
settlement funds and federal grants. We are particularly interested in the comparison 
between the marginal propensity to spend from income of private source and that from 
settlement windfalls. The flypaper effect predicts that the tobacco revenue tends to 
stimulate more public spending than private income, i.e. β1 < β2. The size of the fiscal 
impact of settlement receipts is also interesting. Estimated β2 that falls between zero and 
one represents the extent to which settlement revenue crowds out revenues of state own 
source in public spending. If β2 is greater than one it implies that, on average, state 
government spends more than one dollar in response to a dollar of tobacco windfall and 
hence needs to match high public spending with incomes from other sources. 
                                                 
46 We exclude the District of Columbia and the U.S. Commonwealths that are participants in the MSA. 
Throughout this study, fiscal year refers to the state’s fiscal year. In most states, the fiscal year begins on 
July 1 and ends on June 30. The exceptions are in Alabama and Michigan where the fiscal year begins on 




The fixed-trend specification is adopted to deal with a potential endogeneity problem in 
the variable Settle due to the dependence of settlement revenue on the historical Medicaid 
expenditure. Specifically, the allocation process of settlement payments among states 
indicates that state historical Medicaid expenditure was one of the major determinants in 
the settlement allocation as the settlement was intended to compensate states for their 
high historical spending when treating smoking-related illnesses. The higher Medicaid 
cost a state had incurred in the past, the larger share of settlement revenue it received. On 
the other hand, Medicaid expenditure comprises about one third of state direct 
expenditures annually and is also trending over time. This leads to a spurious link 
between settlement receipts and state spending, since both are positively correlated with 
past Medicaid cost. The fixed-effect model would fail to address this endogeneity issue 
and lead to an overestimation of the causal effect of Settle. The fixed-trend model, on the 
other hand, can resolve the endogeneity concern since the settlement receipts depend only 
on historical level of Medicaid cost rather than its growth. The linkage of endogeneity 
that operates through levels of settlement payments and state spending is broken in the 
fixed-trend model, provided that the changes in settlement receipts by states over years 
does not depend on the growth of contemporaneous Medicaid cost or that of state 
aggregate public spending. Simply put, allowing the state fixed trend is equivalent to the 
approach that implicitly controls for state specific propensity to spend on Medicaid, 
which should resolve the endogeneity issue due to the dependence of Settle on the state 
spending history of Medicaid. 
 
The fixed-trend approach doesn’t come without any caveat, however. Particularly, the 
data variation in the fixed trend model primarily comes from transitory deviations from 
the trend of spending and these transitory deviations may be subject to contamination of 
unexplained noise. In other words, the marginal propensities of public spending, β’s, are 
now determined by changes in income sources that lead to transitory deviations in state 
spending from its trend. Since the time trend picks up the effect of permanent factors in 
income shocks and leaves only transitory variation to be explained by changes in various 
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income sources, the coefficients of those income variables may be estimated with larger 
standard errors in comparison to those in other models, for example, a fixed effect model. 
 
An additional source of endogeneity we are potentially concerned with Settle is regarding 
the bargaining process among the 46 MSA states before reaching the final agreement on 
the splitting shares. If bargaining indeed played a crucial role in the settlement fund 
allocation and was correlated to certain unobservable elements such as spending needs or 
preferences that affect growth of state public spending, our analysis can be potentially 
subject to a policy endogeneity problem discussed intensively in Knight (2002). 
 
One may conjecture that state effort during the collective lawsuits may have been 
rewarded through greater allotment percentage of initial and annual payments. This can 
very likely lead to a policy endogeneity problem since the willingness to engage great 
effort in final resolution of the lawsuits may reflect underlying needs or preferences for 
public spending by the state government. Fortunately, effort was not among the factors 
that determined the shares obtained by states. In stead, a separate category of payments, 
the Strategic Contribution Fund, is intended to compensate for contribution each state 
made during the litigation process. An annual amount of 861 million dollars of the 
Strategic Contribution Fund payments will be made from year 2008 through 2017 to 
states. The percentages vary from 0.8 to 5.8, based upon a separate formula developed by 
a panel of former state attorneys general. Specifically, State of Washington will receive 
5.8%, New York 5.5% and California 5.2% whereas Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and Wyoming get 0.8% 
each. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the allocation allotments of initial and annual payments were 
determined based upon a formula developed by the attorney generals. The process was 
followed by negotiation as some smaller states argued that they should receive a larger 
percentage to enable them to fund smoking cessation programs because they did not have 
the same economy of scale as larger states. The allocation fractions were then adjusted 
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accordingly.47 Although we are unable to obtain the formula we explore the determinants 
of the allocation percentages by conducting a simple cross section OLS analysis as 
elaborated next. We conclude that there was little room for bargaining to play a big role 
in the fund allocation process.48 
 
The allocation percentages are run against the estimated smoking-attributable Medicaid 
expenditure in year 1998, average total population, average population density and 
average adult smoking rate from 1991 through 1998. The explanatory variables are 
chosen according to the agreement documents.49 The regression results are presented in 
Table 0.4. Smoking-related Medicaid expenditure and state population have significant 
and positive effect on the allocation shares. It implies that more populous states with 
higher Medicaid spending in the past were compensated with a greater share. And these 
two factors alone can explain 99 percent of the variations in the percentages across state. 
Population density also has a positive effect that is statistically significant at the 1% level 
although it contributes little to the model’s estimating power. The direction of the effect 
of the adult smoking prevalence rate depends on the specification of the model but it is 
not significantly different from zero after we control for the Medicaid spending and 
population. We also augment the model by incorporating state characteristics that are 
related to anti-smoking policy. One attempt is to include an index variable for the six 
states whose economy heavily relies on tobacco production and to see whether their 
shares differ significantly from the non-tobacco states.50 Our conjecture is that lenient 
anti-tobacco policies adopted by tobacco states, for example, much lower cigarette excise 
tax rates than other states, are very likely to undermine their bargaining power. Column 
(4) of Table 0.4 suggests that tobacco states received a lower fraction of settlement 
receipts and the effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Inclusion of this 
                                                 
47 General Accounting Office. Tobacco Settlement: States’ Use of Master Settlement Agreement Payments, 
page 11. (GAO-01-851, June 2001.) 
48 Singhal (2008) also shows that negotiations among states only resulted in some small adjustments to the 
base percentages. Her study uses simulation to replicate the allocation percentages based on the formula 
that she obtained. The correlation between the simulated results and the percentages under the settlement is 
0.99. The differences are small. 
49 General Accounting Office. Tobacco Settlement: States’ Use of Master Settlement Agreement Payments, 
page 11. (GAO-01-851, June 2001.) 




indicator, however, neither has any crucial impact on estimated coefficients of other 
variables nor increases the explanatory power of the model since the adjusted R-squared 
barely changes. In summary, the allocation percentages almost perfectly reflect state 
historical smoking-related medical expenditures, indicating that the negotiation played 
little role during the allocation process. Therefore, policy endogeneity doesn’t pose a 
large concern in our analysis. 
 
So far we have identified and attempted to resolve various potential endogeneity 
problems associated with Settle. The federal aid variable, Aid, should also be handled 
with caution due to its aggregate nature. The federal aid to states usually consists of open-
ended matching grants like Medicaid which is the largest part of federal aid, closed-ended 
matching grants as highway aid, and block grants such as Title I grant or TANF.51  Block 
grants are lump-sum transfers, the amount of which does not depend on the level of state 
spending and hence its effect is purely income effect. Matching grants, however, work as 
subsidies to state governments by effectively lowering the price of public goods 
provision.52 The amount of matching grants that states receive is thus endogenous to how 
much they actually spend. The fixed-trend specification alleviates the endogeneity 
problem. Nonetheless, there can still be a potential bias transmitted from Aid to Settle as 
long as the correlation between these two variables exists. Since our focus is the 
settlement revenue rather than the federal grant in this study we show in the next section 
that our results, particularly the coefficient of Settle, are robust to the exclusion of the 
grant variable from the regression. Furthermore, we are able to pin down the range for the 
income effect of Settle. Hence, we conclude that bias from estimating the coefficient of 
Aid, β3, does not transmit an important bias to our coefficient of interest. 
4.4 Results 
The basic results are presented in Table 0.5. We investigate further the heterogeneous 
impacts of various income sources on state spending in Table 0.6. The data period is from 
fiscal year 1992 to 2002. Data from the pre-settlement period are included to control for 
                                                 
51 Medicaid accounted for 42% of total federal aid to states in the fiscal year 2002. 
52 For closed-ended matching, the price incentive is effective only when the expenditure is below the cap. 
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the time trend in state public spending. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
reported. P-values from F-tests on the hypothesis that settlement windfalls stimulate more 
public spending than voter private income are laid out in the bottom of the tables for the 
corresponding regressions. 
 
Results of the baseline fixed-trend model in Table 0.5 show that the estimated coefficient 
of settlement revenue is 1.182, significantly different from zero at the 1% level but not 
different from one. This suggests that state direct spending increases by $1.182 in 
response to a one dollar settlement payment. One dollar increase in per capita personal 
income, however, leads to about 8 cents of increase in state spending and the effect is 
also significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The F-test further shows that the 
income impact of exogenous settlement windfalls is significantly greater than that of an 
equivalent increase in voter personal income and thus is supportive of the existence of the 
flypaper effect. 
 
Not surprisingly, state spending also responds to the amount of federal aid received. The 
magnitude of the response is 0.549, statistically significant at the 1% level. Although this 
coefficient estimate is in the ballpark of findings from other studies in the literature we 
suspect it is still somewhat overestimated due to the endogeneity problem elaborated 
early. The primary concern of the potential bias in the federal aid variable is that the 
coefficient estimates of other variables may be affected due to transit bias. So we 
examine the sensitivity of other coefficient estimates to the potential endogeneity in the 
federal aid variable by excluding it from the regression. The results in column (2) of 
Table 0.5 show that the estimates without the federal aid variable (Aid) in which case the 
effect of Settle are underestimated. The magnitude for the estimated effect of settlement 
drops slightly to 0.991. The standard error changes little, and so does the estimate for the 
personal income coefficient. Since the true effect of federal aid must lie between 0 and 
0.549 we are confident that the true effect for the settlement payment will be in the range 
of 0.991 and 1.182. The supporting evidence comes from a series of constrained 
regressions that we run by pre-imposing the coefficient of Aid at various values within 
the range between 0 and 0.549. This exercise allows us to observe the changes in the 
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coefficient of Settle and the associated standard error, and to numerically examine the 
transit bias. Results of the exercise show that the estimated coefficient of Settle changes 
monotonically with the imposed value of the federal aid coefficient, and the size is 
bounded between 0.991 and 1.182.53 At the same time, the standard error almost remains 
the same. The estimated effect from personal income exhibits a similar pattern. For the 
purpose of inference on the flypaper effect of Settle, we therefore conclude that the 
endogeneity bias associated with Aid due to the feature of matching grants does not exert 
practically important impact on our main results. 
 
Compared with Ladd’s natural experiment study which utilizes TRA86 windfalls as 
exogenous income shock, we find more marked flypaper effect associated with tobacco 
settlement. To the best of our understanding, this difference in the sizes of spending 
response can be explained by differences in voter information and voter perceptions on 
the windfall allocation. However, these two attributes have exactly the opposite 
predictions. On one hand, voters are most likely to be better informed about the size of 
settlement payment their states obtained through the publicized litigation process and 
publicly available documents of the settlement agreement. In contrast, making a precise 
prediction on the magnitude of the TRA86 windfall is very difficult for both policy 
makers and voters since the tax windfalls were automatically generated through revenue-
sharing and also subject to various uncertainties in the macroeconomic environment.54 
According to Strumpf (1998) reasoning that limited voter information and control over 
the fiscal decisions (imbedding in high overhead levels) causes great rates of spending 
out of the public windfall, the tobacco settlement payment is expected to have a smaller 
flypaper effect than TRA86 tax windfalls. On the other hand, the TRA86 windfalls and 
the tobacco settlement payments stemmed from entirely different income sources from 
the voter standpoint. One was due to the changes in the federal tax codes and the other 
was paid as a compensation for past smoking-related Medicaid spending that states 
                                                 
53 Results of these regressions aren’t reported in the paper but are available from the authors upon request. 
54 In Ladd (1993), the TRA86 windfalls are generated by using different simulation models including 
TAXSIM, ACIR and NASBO/NCSL. The TAXSIM estimates are substantially higher than the ACIR and 
NASBO/NCSL estimates, with the total ranging from $10.5 to $11.9 billion in contrast to the $5.2 billion 
for the ACIR and $5.9 billion for NASBO/NCSL. 
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should not have incurred had the smoking rates been low. As a consequence voters may 
have dramatically different opinions on how to allocate these revenues. In the former 
case, taxpayers to whom the tax windfalls to their states come directly from their personal 
income may be more naturally inclined toward retaining the revenue rather than spending 
them. In the latter, voters are more likely to support spending the windfalls on anti-
smoking activities, health programs and other categories that had been crowded out by 
smoking-related Medicaid expenses in the past. Our results show that the flypaper 
phenomenon is more substantial in the tobacco settlement case, which is probably not a 
surprise considering fiscal crises most states have experienced since the year when they 
started to receive the payment. 
 
We further add interaction terms to the baseline model and explore whether the income 
effect of Settle varies across states. In other words, we use certain state characteristics to 
examine potential heterogeneity in the degree of the flypaper effect. The results are 
presented in Table 0.6. 
 
In column (2), fifty states are categorized into two groups based upon the extent to which 
state economy relies on tobacco related production. We conjecture that the settlement 
revenue may be spent differently in the six major tobacco states than in other states. In 
those states whose economic growth heavily relies on tobacco industry, settlement 
payment is less likely to be viewed as the pure windfall. Instead it may be perceived as a 
mandatory transfer from tobacco manufacturers to the state government, the cost of 
which will eventually be borne by voters, especially those tobacco growers.55 If fiscal 
decisions are made to reflect the voter interest we expect that the settlement revenue is 
more likely to be retained for the tobacco states and thus boosts less public spending.  
Consistent with our expectation, the result in column (2) shows that the six tobacco states 
have a much lower spending response to settlement receipts. One dollar of the payment is 
associated with about zero increase in public spending in tobacco states as opposed to 
                                                 
55 Phase II payments are used particularly to compensate tobacco growers. However, the magnitude of 
compensations is too small to parallel the cost borne by these tobacco growers due to the settlement. 
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$1.26 of increase in non-tobacco states. We can not reject the hypothesis that the 
difference in spending responses equals to zero since the standard error is relatively large. 
 
Furthermore, we investigate how voter characteristics affect the magnitude of flypaper 
effect. One important implication from the median-voter model is that not only median 
voter income but also her socio-economic characteristics are determinants of the 
provision level of public services since her characteristics capture her preferences 
regarding public spending. A simple measure we use here is whether on average voters 
are more or less likely to be smokes or not. For smoking voters, the settlement payment 
looks less like free money, as the burden of the payment will eventually be transferred to 
and at least partially borne by cigarette consumers through higher prices. In fact, 
evidence has shown that the settlement payments are indeed financed by higher cigarette 
prices. The net wholesale price was increased by 36 percent from $62.7 to $85.2 per 
1,000 premium brand cigarette following the master agreement in November 1998.56 In 
states where median voters are less likely to smoke, the settlement payment is 
presumably perceived as windfalls to a greater extent and boosts more public spending. 
Hence our hypothesis is that the spending propensity out of settlement money is lower for 
states with smoking median voters. In our regression analysis, we use state adult smoking 
rates to proxy for probabilities of median voters being smokers. Statistics of adult 
smoking rates are obtained from CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS). Current smokers are defined as persons who reported having smoked more 
than 100 cigarettes and currently smoked every day or some days during the survey 
period. Adult smoking rates are computed by state over year and then averaged through 
1998 and 2002 by state. Then an index variable is generated to represent the group of 
states whose adult smoking rates exceed the national average rate. The high smoking 
index variable is further interacted with per capita settlement revenue in the regression 
listed in column (3) of Table 0.6. As shown, states with the high percentage of smokers 
tend to spend a lot less out of settlement money, 52 cents in response to one dollar of 
windfalls compared to $1.534 by those with low smoking rates, although the difference is 
                                                 




not statistically significant at the conventional level due to the relatively large standard 
error. 
 
The estimates of income effects from the personal income and federal grant are robust to 
the inclusion of the interaction terms. F-tests show a persistent flypaper effect in the 
heterogeneity analyses. 
 
For robustness tests, we exclude the federal aid variable from the heterogeneity analyses. 
Columns (4) – (6) of Table 0.6 illustrate the estimated coefficients for the three 
heterogeneity regressions without the federal aid variable. As shown, the results are by 
and large robust and the main implications persist. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Tobacco settlement payments made by the major tobacco manufactures to the U.S. states 
in the late 1990s serve as a natural experiment for studying the responsiveness of state 
government spending to windfall receipts. The unique features of the payments provide 
us with a natural experiment to analyze fiscal decisions on exogenous income shock, an 
advantage over earlier work in the flypaper literature. Results suggest a strong flypaper 
effect. We find that state governments have greater spending proclivity from the 
settlement windfalls than from personal income. Specifically, state direct spending 
increases by about $1 on average in response to one dollar increase in the settlement 
funds. 
 
We also find that state heterogeneous responses to the windfall income reflect their socio-
economic characteristics. States with higher proportion of adult smoking population or 






Table 0.1: Measures of the Flypaper Effect 
Author Sample MPS from 
income 
MPS from grants 
Grossman (1990) State and federal grants to 136 
Virginia local governments, 1981 
0.01 1.70 
Ladd (1993)a TRA86 windfalls to states 0.03 0.98 
Olmsted et al (1993) State and federal grants to 344 
Missouri school districts, 1980 
0.05 0.58-1.15 
Case et al (1993) Federal grants to states 1970-85 0.11-0.17 0.65-1.04 
Becker (1996) Federal grants to state and local 
governments, 1977-1986 (panel) 
0.06 0.61 
Gamkhar and Oates 
(1996) 
Federal grants to state governments, 
1953-1991 (time-series) 
0.11 0.62 
Strumpf (1998)b Various windfall revenues to 
Pennsylvania municipalities in the 
Philadelphia metropolitan area 
including state liquid fuels highway 
aid fund 
0.24-0.43 0.53-0.57 
Knight (2002) Federal highway grants to 47 state 
governments, 1983-1997 (panel) 
0.01 1.14 
 
Note: This table provides some representative estimates of marginal propensity to spend on public Services. 
Part of contents in the table is adapted from Hines, James R. Jr. and Thaler (1995).  
a MPS from the TRA86 tax windfall is 0.4. 






Table 0.2: State Allocation Percentages 
State Percentages  State Percentages 
Alabama 1.616131  Nebraska 0.594983 
Alaska 0.341419  Nevada 0.609935 
Arizona 1.473885  New Hampshire 0.665934 
Arkansas 0.828066  New Jersey 3.866996 
California 12.76396  New Mexico 0.59639 
Colorado 1.370861  New York 12.76203 
Connecticut 1.856537  North Carolina 2.332285 
Delaware 0.39547  North Dakota 0.366014 
Georgia 2.454458  Ohio 5.03751 
Hawaii 0.601865  Oklahoma 1.036137 
Idaho 0.363263  Oregon 1.147658 
Illinois 4.654247  Pennsylvania 5.746859 
Indiana 2.039803  Rhode Island 0.718905 
Iowa 0.869667  South Carolina 1.176352 
Kansas 0.833671  South Dakota 0.348946 
Kentucky 1.761159  Tennessee 2.440895 
Louisiana 2.255353  Utah 0.444887 
Maine 0.769351  Vermont 0.411185 
Maryland 2.260457  Virginia 2.044745 
Massachusetts 4.038979  Washington 2.053258 
Michigan 4.351948  West Virginia 0.88646 
Missouri 2.274601  Wisconsin 2.072039 
Montana 0.424759  Wyoming 0.248345 
 









Table 0.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable # Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PC state general direct expenditure 











PC federal grant 550 771.4 231.9 386.6 1,886 
PC settlement revenue 155 27.6 14.8 9.6 129.7 
Average adult smoking rate 
(1991~1998) 
50 23.2 2.63 14.9 29.7 
MSA allocation percentage  46 2.135 2.668 0.248 12.764 
 
Note: All financial variables are deflated using year 1992 CPI.   
 
 
Table 0.4: Determinants of State Shares of Settlement Payments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Smoking-related Medicaid expenditure (1998) 1.909 1.856 1.859 1.825 
 (0.102)*** (0.091)*** (0.093)*** (0.088)*** 
Total population (average 1991~1998) 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.260 
 (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** 
Population density (average 1991~1998)  0.537 0.532 0.519 
  (0.148)*** (0.151)*** (0.142)*** 
Average adult smoking rate (1991~1998)   -0.004 0.006 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
Tobacco states    -0.264 
    (0.107)** 
Constant 0.013 -0.062 0.038 -0.176 
 (0.054) (0.052) (0.321) (0.315) 
Observations 46 46 46 46 
Adjusted R-squared 0.990 0.992 0.992 0.993 
 
Note: Dependent variable is stateshares of settlement payments, in percentage terms. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level notation: * at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 




Table 0.5: Estimation of the Income Effects on the State Public Spending (1992-
2002) 
 (1) (2) 
PC personal income 0.077 0.078 
 (0.022)*** (0.023)*** 
PC settlement 1.182 0.991 
 (0.416)*** (0.387)** 
PC federal grant 0.549  
 (0.139)***  
Observations 550 550 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999 0.999 
P-value for F-test 0.004 0.010 
 
Note: Dependent variable is per capita state direct expenditure. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. Coefficients of the state and year dummies and the state fixed trends are omitted.  
Significance level notation: * at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. F-test H0: β2 = β1; H1: β2 
>β1 
 
Table 0.6: Heterogeneous Income Effects on State Public Spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PC personal income 0.076 0.074 0.077 0.075 
 (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)*** 
PC settlement 1.261 1.534 1.080 1.313 
 (0.475)*** (0.569)*** (0.428)** (0.480)*** 
PC federal grant 0.548 0.552   
 (0.139)*** (0.140)***   
(PC settlement)* -1.257  -1.402  
 (tobacco states) (1.642)  (1.449)  
(PC settlement)*   -1.011  -0.928 
 (high adult smoking)  (0.775)  (0.761) 
Observations 550 550 550 550 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
P-value for F-test 0.004 0.030 0.028 0.025 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the per capita state direct expenditure. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. Coefficients of the state and year dummies and the state fixed trends are omitted.   







The first two essays in this dissertation examine the determinants of corporate control 
instruments. The first essay proposes potential benefits from monitoring as important 
determinants of institutional block holding, where the measures for monitoring benefits 
are identified from the information asymmetry problem. I show that agency problems 
attract large institutional holdings for monitoring purpose, and the investors later mitigate 
the problems. The study thus contributes to the existing literature on investor activism, 
which is usually limited to studying the effect of an existing large investor. The study can 
be generalized to cross-country studies on the differences in corporate control structures. 
 
In the second essay, we use the introduction of the U.S. 1996 Telecommunications Act as 
our empirical setting to examine the dynamics of the role of peer performance in 
managerial compensation. The results from 45 pairs of telecommunications and size- and 
performance-matched benchmark firms indicate that the weight on peer performance 
declined post-Act, suggesting that RPE became more valuable for the telecommunication 
firms following the Act. Besides shedding some light on the impact of the Act, our results 
show how managerial incentives in general, and the role of peer performance in 
particular, changed with the firm’s competition environment. The use of a natural 
experiment helps resolve empirical problems concerned with existing studies. Last but 
not the least, our focus on managerial incentives complements the literature on 
telecommunication sector reforms, as those studies usually examine factors such as 





The first two essays are within my main research agenda in organizational economics and 
corporate finance. As a reflection of my other research interest, the third essay 
contributes to the public finance literature by identifying a natural experiment to study 
the response of state spending to windfalls. Our analysis possesses important advantages 
in comparison to most of the existing studies because of the unique features of the 
tobacco settlement funds as exogenous windfall. Results show that one dollar increase in 
the settlement revenue boosts state direct spending by about one dollar, a significantly 
larger spending response than the spending propensity out of the personal disposable 
income. In addition, we find that state heterogeneous responses to the windfall income 


















Theoretical Insert for Chapter 2 
 
Here I consider the monitoring problem again for a risk-averse owner, in order to 
illustrate how the monitoring consideration interacts with risk. Her utility function is 
given by ][1)( xrO OexU
−−= , where Or  is her risk aversion coefficient. If she monitors, the 
owner allocates her wealth by holding a share of α in the firm and the rest in a market 
portfolio. Taking the holdingα as given, and assume fixed monitoring cost M, her 
expected payoff expressed in certainty equivalent is given by: 
[A.1] ][
2
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Since manager’s effort choice is unaffected by owner’s attitude towards risk, the 
investor’s problem is to maximize [A.1] subject to the constraints [2.2] and [2.3]. The 
maximization leads to the same optimal contract given in [2.4]. The effect ofα reflects a 
trade-off for the owner between optimal monitoring incentives and risk diversification: 
the owner must forego some gains from diversification to hold a significant stake in the 
firm. To simplify the calculation for optimal shareholding and payoff, I take the special 
case of perfect monitoring, with the optimal contract given by [2.5]. The problem then 
breaks down to: 
 MrO −− )1(2
1max 2εασα wrt. α  




















I further assume concentrated ownership has no other benefit beyond facilitating 
monitoring: without monitoring, the optimal ownership structure will be perfectly 
dispersed. Hence for the owner, the relevant benchmark to monitoring is the case of 
holding a diversified portfolio with the same stake in the firm that is not monitored 













where y and w are given by the optimal contract in the benchmark case without 
monitoring. With the same size of holding as in the monitoring case, the expected pay-off 
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Appendix B  
 
Data Source for Chapter 4 
 
1. Data for state general direct expenditures and federal grants are obtained from the 
Census Bureau publication State Government Finances (fiscal year 1992~2002).     
 
2. The information on the financial management and appropriation of tobacco settlement 
revenue is obtained from State Management and Allocation of Tobacco Settlement 
Revenue 2002 published by the National Conference of State Legislatures.   
 
3. Data for personal disposable income and total population are taken from the Regional 
Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis for various years.  The 
online source is http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi/. 
 
4. Data on adult smoking rates are obtained from CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System surveys.  
 
5. Data on smoking-related Medicaid expenditure are taken from CDC’s publication 
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